



Turun yliopisto
University of Turku

ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS TO ENSURE EQUITABLE BURDEN-SHARING OF REFU- GEES IN THE EU

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Author:
Anna Ylöstalo

Supervisors:
D.Sc. Elina Pelto
D.Sc. Milla Wirén

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Turun kauppakorkeakoulu • Turku School of Economics

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 An issue as old as time

Crises and wars around the globe have for centuries forced people to find refuge in other countries. The rights of these people have been protected by various international agreements, but only in 1951 was a conclusive agreement signed by 147 Member States of the United Nations. This is the 1951 Geneva Convention, which was introduced by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) established in 1950 by the United Nations. The 1951 Convention was initially created to ensure the rights and obligations of World War II refugees, but in 1967 a Protocol was released which expanded the extent of the legislation to cover the whole population of the world. (UNCHR 2010, 2–6; UNCHR 2011, 1–7.)

The European Union has been working on a harmonised asylum policy since 1999, when the European Council met in Tampere to establish a ‘common European asylum system’ (Lavenex 2001, 851). No mutual understanding was reached in Tampere, but a common ground for the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was formed (Lavenex 2001, 851; European Commission 2015). Since then the European Commission has taken several legislative measures to unify asylum policies within the EU (European Commission 2015), the latest being the revised Directives effective since July 2015.

2015 was a particularly significant year in the history of asylum seekers in Europe and the EU Member States. The European Union is currently facing the largest influx of asylum seekers in years (Brenke 2015, 511). How the EU handles this ‘refugee crisis’ will have an immense and long-lasting impact on the EU Member States and their economies. Troianovski (2015, 5) concludes that the current crisis will highlight the importance of fair burden-sharing policies and encourage the more heavily burdened countries to demand an equitable sharing of the burden. The European Commission has been working on common legislation throughout the year and the implementation of the revised Directives has begun. (European Union 2014, 3).

The distribution of refugees among EU Member States is uneven and this affects countries with external borders with the EU, such as Greece, Malta and Italy the most (Brenke 2015, 511). The CEAS aims to create a common area of protection and solidarity, and the European Commission has taken steps to address the pressure these countries face by instituting relocation programmes (European Commission 2016). These relocation programmes will allocate refugees more evenly across Member States and thus have an impact on each country’s economy. A fair sharing of the burden is also crucial because a surge of asylum seekers and refugees has an economic impact on the host country’s economy and if the burden is shared inequitably the economic effects are also inequitable. The

International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2016, 4) concludes in their analysis that the current refugee crisis will have both short- and long-term effects on the economies of the receiving countries. Short-term effects will include for example an annual increase of 0.15 percent in the population of the EU (IMF 2016, 13). The rise in population will lead to higher fiscal spending and it is estimated that total GDP in the EU will also be positively affected (IMF 2016, 14, 32).

These demographic changes affect the national and international markets as well. The sheer increase in population will boost aggregate demand, which in turn will lead to investments and greater labour demand (IMF 2016, 4, 13, 23, 33). The IMF (2016, 1, 3) report suggests that it will take approximately two years to integrate refugees into the labour market. The report also highlights that a notable number of refugees have tertiary education. For example, in Germany, 21 percent of refugees have a tertiary degree while the equivalent figure for native Germans is only two percent higher (IMF 2016, 13, 17). According to Arora (2014, 25), young and skilled labour correlates positively with innovation and increases both productivity and income per capita. The number of refugees will eventually boost the supply of labour force, and thus it can also have a positive effect on the labour opportunities and wages of the native population (IMF 2016, 22).

A fair sharing of the burden is integral in order to overcome the crisis and handle the situation to the best of the EU's abilities. Equal sharing of the burden guarantees that the economic effects, both negative and positive, will also be equitably distributed between Member States. This is crucial because the economic effects are also cumulative and long ranging (Arora 2014, 25; IMF 2016, 4). This thesis will examine how the burden could be shared more efficiently and equitable using suggestions developed in the light of the 2015 crisis.

1.2 Key terminology

In order to fully comprehend the following, some key terms must be defined. In this thesis, the Geneva Conventions 1951 definition of a **refugee** mentioned before will be used as it is the international standard. The Geneva convention defines refugee as someone:

'who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion'
(Geneva Convention 1951).

Bobby Thomas Cameron (2014, 9), a health policy analyst, introduces the idea that the 1951 Geneva Convention definition excludes thousands of people in similar situations to

recognized refugees as not being refugees. This is largely due to the need to create a uniform definition in order to be able assess the “person’s worthiness of protection”. This implies that the number of people in situations similar to those of persons who have been granted international protection is much higher than the number of recognised refugees. (Cameron 2014, 9–10.)

An asylum seeker, on the other hand, is defined by the UNHCR as someone who claims to be a refugee but who has not yet been declared a refugee (UNHCR). The main difference between asylum seekers and refugees is that refugees are granted a status of international protection. **An asylum seeker** is someone who has lodged a claim for asylum and they have not yet been recognized as people in need of international protection. Cameron (2014, 10–11) defines asylum seekers to be people in search of safety. They differ radically from other types of migrants, because their main objective is to find safety (Cameron 2014, 10–11). In this thesis, the terms refugee and asylum seeker often appear together even though they are not used as synonyms, but because they can be seen as a process (asylum seekers can gain refugee status). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the different terms. An asylum seeker and refugee are most commonly either resettled in a final destination country (recognised refugee) or have travelled to the final destination country by themselves to claim asylum and thus in the hopes of being granted refugee status in the destination country.




Figure 1 Chart of the relations between different terms (adopted from Dustmann et al. 2017, 503)

As figure 1 demonstrates, one can receive a refugee status in different ways. The difference between a resettled recognised refugee and an asylum seeker is that even though

they both currently reside in the destination country the asylum seeker's claim can be rejected and thus not be granted refugee status. This might lead to deportation or the asylum seeker might receive temporary protection from the destination country. If the asylum seeker stays in the destination country illegally, they are often referred to as paperless persons who are often excluded from the society as not being recognised as citizens or residents of the destination country.

An asylum seeker's claim can be rejected for many reasons and sometimes these people are labelled as economic immigrants. In this thesis, an **economic immigrant** is defined as someone who moves to a foreign country in the hopes of improving their economic situation (Lavenex 2001, 882). The distinction between immigrants and refugees is of great importance due to the current legislation, which is only binding in the case of refugees (Lavenex 2001, 882).

A **displaced person** as defined by the United Nations educational, scientific and cultural organization (UNESCO) denotes a larger term referring to people who have had to leave their local environment due to for example wars, natural disasters, famine or a poor economic situation (UNESCO 2016). In literature, the term appears to cover the true number of people, as it includes people who have been forced to flee their homes but have not yet been recognized as refugees and have not yet made a claim for asylum. In this thesis, only asylum seekers and refugees are discussed as they have already recognised their own need for international protection.

1.3 Aim of the thesis

“Nine Member States in the EU today receive 90% of all asylum applications annually, but those nine Member States are starting to, well, become fed up.” (Tobias Billström, Immigration Minister of Sweden, 3rd of March 2014.)

The aim of the thesis is to analyse what kind of burden-sharing mechanisms have been suggested in the light of the present crisis and how they fit to the existing theoretical framework. This thesis will investigate the possible burden-sharing mechanisms related to refugee and asylum seeker policies and reflect on their conductibility and effectiveness. This will be done by contrasting and comparing the post-crisis suggestions to the current policies and international burden-sharing theory. This will be done by conducting a qualitative content analysis on the recently (2015–2018) suggested methods of burden sharing. The qualitative content analysis is built around the theory of international burden-sharing methods introduced by Thielemann (2008, 3) which are explored in chapter 4.

The research question in this thesis is “How should the issue of burden-sharing be addressed in the EU post 2015?” To understand and effectively evaluate new suggestions, a look on the current distribution is provided, different definitions of ‘burden’ are discussed and the current policies in place will be explored. Sub-questions that will be explored in this thesis are:

- Why should the issue be addressed?
- What are the prerequisites for a working method?

The research design is illustrated in figure 2, where the phases of the research have been divided into the aim of the thesis, the supporting information, the theoretical background, the data collection process and the analysis and results.




Figure 2 Research design

This thesis will follow the structure of the research design shown in figure 2. The structure is illustrated in more detail in figure 3, where the different processes are described in the order in which they will be presented in the thesis.




Figure 3 Structure of the thesis

As shown in figure 3, the thesis will start with a look into the current distribution of the burden and definitions of the concept 'burden'. Next, the thesis will explore the current policies in place after which it will move onto discussing the existing international burden-sharing mechanisms. After an introduction to the theory and the subject, the research process will be described in detail and the results of the content analysis will be showcased. Discussion on the findings will follow and the thesis will conclude with suggestions for further research.

2 DISTRIBUTION OF BURDEN-SHARING

In the following the distributions of the burden between different EU Member States will be examined. An approach to the concept of burden-sharing, introduced by Thielemann (2008, 3) will also be examined. Burden-sharing is an integral part of solidarity within the EU. Leaders of the EU have stressed, even before the Common European Asylum System was put in place, that a common policy in asylum, migration and borders “should be based on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility including its financial implications and closer practical co-operation between Member States” (European Council 2004, 18).

The concept of burden-sharing can be problematic. On the one hand, the concept of the “burden” can be understood to mean different things, and on the other hand, the concept of “sharing” can be measured in different ways. The burden can be shared in absolute and relative terms, for example. The expression ‘burden-sharing’ will be used, because it appears in official documents as well as in scientific journals most commonly when addressing the issue. An alternative way of expressing this concept would be to use ‘responsibility sharing’ as mentioned by Dustmann et al. (2017, 532) and Thielemann (2018, 74) who all note that responsibility-sharing can be used instead of the term ‘burden-sharing’.

2.1 Defining burden

In crises such as the current one, the views of politicians can differ vastly. While Western European countries see this crisis as a humanitarian one, some European countries see it as a threat and a burden to the host countries, because they believe that most asylum seekers are de facto economic immigrants rather than people seeking refuge. (Diaconu 2015, 882; Mueller-Using & Vöpel 2014, 95). What is generally understood as the ‘burden’ in the term ‘burden-sharing’ refers to the number of asylum seekers and refugees and the costs they generate in the host country (Brenke 2015, 511–512; Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 640–647).

The term ‘burden-sharing’ appears in many contexts in literature. The term is based on intra-EU solidarity to share the financial, economic and cultural burden of refugees equally between Member States (Thielemann 2008, 2). Article 63 of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (2002, 58) states that the Council will take into use methods that promote: “a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons”. The recently updated Common European Asylum Policy also strives for a more equal sharing of the burden (European Commission 2015). Moraga and Rapoport (2014, 644) also note that the European Refu-

gee Fund, established in 2000 and later rearranged as the AMIF, helps even out the financial burden borne by those countries receiving more refugees than they would were the burden equally distributed.

In this thesis other ways of understanding the meaning of ‘burden’ in the concept of ‘burden-sharing’ are also examined. Hosting asylum seekers and refugees in a host country is a reactive measure. Besides reactive measures, Member States can also engage in proactive measures, such as those proposed by Thielemann (2008, 7) as peacekeeping missions, humanitarian aid and education in the countries of origin of the asylum seekers and refugees. Broadening the definition of ‘burden’ would give a more comprehensive understanding of the contributions made by each Member State.

2.2 Distribution of asylum seekers and refugees in the EU

The European Union’s role as a region that receives asylum seekers has been a major one for a long time. According to data from the UNCHR, which was analysed by Hatton (2009, 185), the EU-15 received 68 percent of all asylum applications lodged between 1980 and 2005. In more recent years, Brenke (2015, 1) states that the European Union is facing “its largest influx of asylum seekers in years”. Large influxes of asylum seekers generally occur after major conflicts, such as wars or natural disasters (Hatton 2009, 86).

The geographical location of the conflict has a major impact on which countries or regions are most affected by the surge of asylum seekers, but it is not the only criterion. The West has been seen as a preferable receiving region due to its more advanced economy and welfare system. (Hatton 2009, 209.) Based on the data from the UNCHR analysed by Hatton (2009, 188), European countries such as Germany, France and the UK have over the years received larger amounts of asylum claims than other countries. Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 640) concluded that 79 percent of all asylum seekers, who came to the EU in 2012, arrived in one of the six following countries: Germany, France, Greece, Austria, UK and Sweden. Figure 4 illustrates the geographical distribution of refugees and people in refugee-like situations (UNHCR 2015).




Figure 4 Geographical distribution of refugees and persons in refugee-like situation in 2015 (UNHCR 2015).

As can be seen from figure 4, the recent conflict in the Middle East has logically led to a surge in the number of asylum seekers in Europe due to its geographical proximity. The figures show that the distribution of these asylum seekers has not been equitable among EU Member States. Countries with external borders with the EU have been placed under immense pressure to cope with the growing amount of asylum seekers. These include, in particular, Greece, Italy and Malta (Brenke 2015, 1). Owing to the Dublin policy of the country of first entry, the Member States with external borders with the EU are under the greatest strain. The Dublin policy states that an asylum seeker must submit his or her claim in the Member State where they first arrive. (Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 639; European Commission 2017b)


The European Union has created an EU Resettlement Programme to resettle refugees more evenly among Member States (Moraga and Rapoport 2015, 644). A resettlement programme can ease some pressure from the countries with external borders. The effectiveness of the EU Resettlement Programme is debatable. Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 644) suggest that the “EU has failed to implement the program on a large scale”. Statistics from the UNHCR (2013) analysed by Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 644) suggest that around five percent of the total number of refugees in the world were resettled under the Resettlement Programme.

2.3 Relative distribution

Whilst it can be concluded from statistics and previous studies that the distribution of asylum seekers and refugees in the EU has not been equitable in terms of the absolute amount of asylum seekers and refugees, we should further investigate the relative distribution of asylum seekers and refugees in the EU. Comparing absolute asylum figures when analysing the country-specific burdens of Member States is often deceptive. The notion of a relatively even distribution of asylum seekers and refugees denotes the idea of a proportionate distribution based on given predetermined country-specific factors, such as financial, economic, demographic and geographical capabilities. (Brenke 2015, 1; Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 642; Thielemann 2008, 2).

When factoring in the population of the receiving country, Member States such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden prove to be among the most heavily burdened countries. For example, between 1994 and 2002 these Member States were among those with the highest rates of asylum seekers per capita. (Thielemann 2008, 2–3.) Moraga and Rapoport (2014, 642) found in their research that the six countries in Europe receiving the highest numbers of refugees in terms of absolute values were Germany, France, Greece, Austria, the UK and Sweden. In relative terms, their studies showed that even between these six countries the burdens vary considerably. According to their research, Germany and Sweden plus Switzerland, which was not among the six largest receiving countries in Europe, host a relatively large number of refugees when compared to their geographic size and population. (Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 640.)

Figure 5 is an illustrative graph of the percent of asylum seekers that would have to be redistributed to reach a fair sharing of the burden when accounting for population. The calculations show that the inequitableness of sharing the burden rose notably during the early 1990s and has begun to rise significantly again in 2012. Since then it has been on the rise. An interesting conclusion of the studies is that the burden is shared more equitably between EU-15 Member States than among the entire EU-27 area as the Hoover index in figure 5 demonstrates. (Brenke 2015, 512–513.)



1 EU until 2003, Germany until 1991 *old* Federal Republic.

2 EU with accession countries of 2004 and 2007.

3 In relation to the population of 2014.

Sources: Eurostat; calculations by DIW Berlin.

Figure 5 Hoover index of concentration of asylum seekers across countries of the EU in relation to the population of the countries (Brenke 2015, 513).

Figure 5 reveals that the percentage of asylum seekers that should be redistributed were the burden shared equitably according to population was the lowest just prior to onset of the current crisis when it was just over 20 percent. An inequitable distribution is on the rise again and approaching 50 percent, meaning that over half of all asylum seekers should be redistributed were the burden to be shared equally between the Member States according to population. (Brenke 2015, 512–513.)

A conclusion can be made in light of these studies that the distribution of asylum seekers and refugees in the EU and Europe has been and still is uneven. During the current crisis, it has been learned that most refugees and asylum seekers are currently headed for central Europe, Sweden and Member States with external borders. This suggests that these countries are faced with a bigger burden than they would have were the burden distributed evenly. (Brenke 2015, 511.)

3 POLICIES CURRENTLY IN PLACE

3.1 The Common European Asylum System and the Revised Directives

The European Union has worked towards a common asylum system since the 1999 EU Council meeting (Lavenex 2001, 851). The harmonisation of asylum policies continued up until 2005. In 2008 the European Commission issued a Policy Plan on Asylum in response to the 2007 Green Paper, which discussed the development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). (European Commission 2015.)

The most recent changes to the EURODAC Regulation, part of the CEAS, were implemented in July 2015. This date was also the deadline for Member States to transpose their national laws and regulations to match the revised Directives and Regulations. The revised Directives and Regulations were put into place in 2013. (European Commission 2015.)

3.1.1 *The revised Asylum Procedures Directive*

The revised Asylum Procedures Directive defines how one can apply for asylum in an EU Member State and how the processing and handling of the claim should be conducted by the Member State receiving the claim. The previous asylum procedures Directive has been deemed too vague, failing to guarantee the basic standards for processing an asylum claim that the asylum seeker is eligible for. The revised Asylum Procedures Directive sets out a clear set of rules for Member States to follow. These common rules are supposed to make the process more efficient and decrease the processing time. (European Union 2014, 2–4; European Commission 2015.)

The revised Directive also better ensures the safety of unaccompanied minors and victims of torture. It also specifies the asylum seeker's right to appeal. New rules on appeals aim to reduce the amount of cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights, thus decreasing the costs and involvement of the European Court of Human Rights. (European Union 2014, 2–4; European Commission, Asylum Procedures 2016; European Commission 2015.)

The 2015 refugee crisis has demonstrated the inability of the revised Asylum Procedures Directives to reach its goal a proposal for the reform of the entire system was made in July 2016. The reform is intended to be “fair and efficient” and to remove incentives of asylum shopping and secondary movement. The goal is to establish a truly international protection procedure which would further harmonise the policies between Member

States. Actions the European Commission plans to take to reach this goal are for example simplifying procedures, shortening application periods and an EU-wide list of safe countries of origin (currently safe countries of origin are listed at national level only). (European Commission 2017c.)

A set of common procedures also serve to harmonise the pull factors of different Member States so that a country cannot appear unappealing to asylum seekers because of a stricter policy on asylum procedures. Thielemann (2008, 6) suggests that policy harmonisation might in fact counteract the efforts of equal distribution, because Member States are unable to use national laws and regulations to counterbalance their “unique structural pull-factors” such as language, labour market, colonial ties etc. Hatton (2009, 209), on the other hand, notes that scientific studies have been able to prove a positive relationship between tougher policies, especially those that reduce the success rate of a claim being approved, and the decline of asylum applications. This means, however, that national asylum policies could be used to counterbalance large influxes of asylum applications and thus redistribute the burden.

3.1.2 Revised Reception Conditions Directive

The Reception Conditions Directive aims to define the conditions set up for asylum seekers while they wait for their claim to be processed. The Reception Conditions Directive is derived from the basic human rights defined by the United Nations. It ensures the right to “housing, food, healthcare and employment, as well as medical and psychological care”. (European Union 2014, 2, 5; European Commission 2015.)

The revised policy has taken measures to further define the common rules each EU Member State must comply with. In particular, the revised policy defines the reasons why an asylum seeker can be held in detention, limits the detention of vulnerable persons, defines important legal rights asylum seekers have when given a detention order, specifies the conditions of detention facilities and guarantees access to employment. The policy also further amplifies the role of vulnerable persons and the special care they need. (European Union 2014, 2, 5; European Commission 2015.)

The reform of the CEAS includes a proposal for a new Reception Conditions Directive which further aims at harmonising the implementation of the Directives in each Member State to reduce the incentive for secondary movement. The proposal includes actions to make the integration process of refugees to the labour market faster, thus decreasing the incentive to secondary movement due to labour and economic incentives. (European Commission 2017b.)

The effects of policy harmonisation on the revised Reception Conditions Directive are similar to those of the revised Asylum Procedures Directive. Thielemann (2008, 6) notes

that in addition to national asylum policies, factors that affect the choice of a desirable host country are structural. Structural factors include for example employment opportunities, historical networks and geography (Thielemann 2008, 6). Brenke's (2015, 515) findings support this claim, as he concludes that asylum seekers often seek refuge from a country where displaced persons from the same originating country have previously been granted refuge. Employment opportunities also play a huge role and asylum seekers whose claims are rejected are commonly classified as economic migrants (Hatton 2009, 183; Diaconu 2016, 882). By contrast, Hatton's (2009, 209) studies suggest that tougher asylum policies which weaken socio-economic conditions do not correlate positively with fewer asylum applications.

3.1.3 *Revised Qualification Directive*

The Qualification Directive "specifies the grounds for granting international protection" (European Union 2014, 6). The previous version of the Directive was too vague to ensure a fair handling of asylum claims, since the probability of an asylum seeker being granted refugee status could vary enormously between different Member States. The revised Directive aims to improve the decision-making process and to ensure people eligible for international protection the protection they need. (European Union 2014, 2, 6; European Commission 2015.)

The revised Directive sets out a clear set of criteria for granting asylum, thus making the process faster and more efficient. It also aims to reduce the number of fraudulent claims. The Directive also describes the rights all persons granted international protection are entitled to, including employment and healthcare. (European Union 2014, 2, 6; European Commission 2015.)

After the 2015 refugee crisis, the revised Qualification Directive has been examined and like other directives, a new proposal has been made to ensure harmonised rules between Member States and to guarantee the convergence of asylum decisions. The new 2016 proposal includes measures that further specify the period of international protection that is sufficient and address the movement and rights of the beneficiaries of a person who has been granted a refugee status. (European Commission 2017a.)

One of the main goals listed in the CEAS is to examine claims against "uniform standards so that, no matter where an applicant applies, the outcome will be similar" (European Commission, 2015). Hatton's (2009, 189) comprehensive studies conclude that over the period from 1982 to 2006 28 percent of all claims were accepted, 18 percent of which were granted refugee status and the rest were allowed to stay on humanitarian grounds (Hatton 2009, 189). This means that around two-thirds of asylum claims were rejected. Brenke's (2015, 516) more recent study comes to the same conclusion using Germany as

an example: around one third of the asylum claims lodged between January and July 2015 were accepted, the rest being rejected or forwarded to another Member State under the Dublin Regulation (Brenke 2015, 516). Troianovski (2015, 5) also notes that the second largest group of asylum seekers in Germany does not come from war zones, but from within the European area from less economically developed locations. This correlates with the high amount of rejections, as most of these European countries are seen as ‘safe countries of origin’ (European Union 2015).

3.1.4 *Revised Dublin Regulation*

The idea behind the Dublin Regulation was to ensure that the burden of asylum seekers would be distributed evenly among Member States and that all asylum claims would be handled in only one EU Member State. The Dublin Regulation has failed to reach this goal and it has been recognized that the EU needs to be able to address situations where certain Member States are pressurized beyond their capacity to handle the situation. (European Union 2014, 2, 7; European Commission 2015.)

The revised Regulation aims for the EU to be better prepared for crisis situations, equipped to address the problems of the national asylum systems and to deal with the pressure. It also guarantees asylum seekers the right to personal interviews, legal assistance and the possibility of being considered irregular immigrants instead of asylum seekers. The Regulation also clarifies the duties of the Member States in relation to the Dublin procedure and transfer decisions. (European Union 2014, 2, 7; European Commission Dublin 2015; European Commission 2015.)

The Dublin Regulation has been heavily criticized throughout its existence. De Bruycker et al. (2010, 157–159) conclude that the Dublin Regulation has failed in three ways: (1) it has failed to cope with the inequitable treatment of asylum seekers across the Member States, (2) it has not succeeded in improving the integration of asylum systems and guaranteeing the safety of the applicants and (3) it has not been able to carry out transfers, thus wasting resources. The EU Commission has also recognized this problem and in its Green Paper, concluded that the Dublin System may in fact hinder fair burden-sharing, as countries with external borders are faced with “particular migratory pressures because of their geographical location” (Commission of the European Communities 2007, 10). De Bruycker et al. (2010, 163) also recognize the same problem and suggest that the Dublin System counteracts fair burden-sharing.

In response to the heavy criticism of the Dublin Regulation especially during the refugee crisis of 2015, the Commission has reviewed its policies and a revised Dublin Regulation (IV) has been proposed in the proposal of the CEAS Reform. The changes pro-

posed to the Dublin Regulation aim at tackling the issue for which it has been most heavily criticised: fair and equitable sharing of responsibility. It has been proposed that the issue be addressed by adding a corrective allocation system to the Dublin Regulation. This would mean that if one Member State receives a disproportionate (in accordance to its size and wealth) number of claims, all further claims are relocated until the application number falls back below the reference level set by the EU. The indicators used to define initial relocation distribution are population size, GDP, unemployment rate and the number of spontaneous asylum claims and the number of resettled refugees between 2010 and 2014. The new proposal also includes an option to temporarily opt out of the reallocation system for a contribution of 250 000 euros per person assigned to that Member State under the new proposal. (European Commission 2017d.) It should be noted that this is still a proposal and not the current regulation.

3.1.5 *Revised EURODAC Regulation*

EURODAC is a fingerprint database that enables the Member States to process asylum claims and act on the Dublin Regulation more effectively. The EURODAC has been collecting fingerprint data from asylum seekers since 2003 and since then has proven to be a very effective IT tool. (European Union 2014, 2, 8; European Commission 2015.)

The previous EURODAC Regulation did not set Member States proper time limits for fingerprint data to be transmitted to the EURODAC Central system. The revised Regulation tackles this issue by setting new time limits for the fingerprints to be transmitted, thus keeping the database more up to date. A significant change to the EURODAC Regulation is that the fingerprint database is no longer limited to the use of asylum purposes, but can now be used by the national police forces and Europol to further investigate criminal activities. This broadening of the Regulation has been put in place to clamp down on serious crime and terrorism. The revised EURODAC Regulation plays a major part in regulating the Dublin Regulation, as it increases and facilitates information exchange between Member States. The CEAS Reform proposes that in addition to a fingerprint, also an additional biometric identifier would be taken of all incoming third country persons. The Reform also proposes that fingerprints could be used to facilitate return procedures of third country persons who have not submitted a claim for asylum within five years of arriving. (European Union 2014, 2, 8; European Commission 2015; European Commission 2017e.)

Due to a unified Pan-European free-movement area and the removal of border controls, which makes it hard to limit the mobility of non-EU citizens, including asylum seekers, the EURODAC is an important tool. The ability for third country nationals to move freely within the EU might also discourage countries with external borders with the

EU to follow the EURODAC Regulation, as it would only lead to an increase in the number of asylum seekers they are responsible for. For example, Greece has received an infringement decision from the European Commission for failing to comply with the EURODAC Regulation (European Commission – press release 2015).

3.2 Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund

Before the Asylum, migration and integration fund (AMIF) was founded, the European Refugee Fund (ERF) was created to assist in burden-sharing. Since asylum claims in the EU are not equally distributed between Member States, the ERF was created to be able to allocate funds to countries facing more pressure from higher application numbers. The ERF co-finances, for example, reception accommodation infrastructures and service improvements, legal and social assistance for refugees and asylum seekers and intra-EU transfers. The EU states that the ERF plays a part in guaranteeing European solidarity by allocating funds and co-funding projects that guarantee displaced persons “access to consistent, fair and effective asylum procedures”. For the years 2014–2020, the ERF forms part of the EU solidarity Action and the EU funding for Home Affairs. The ERF was re-organized for the years 2014 through 2020 into the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), which focuses on the following four objectives: asylum, legal migration and integration, return and solidarity. From the viewpoint of asylum-seeking refugee policy, it aids in developing the CEAS, ensures safe and effective return methods and supervises solidarity related to asylum flow issues in the Member States. (European Commission 2014; European Commission, Home Affairs 2011, 1–12.)

Moraga and Rapoport (2014, 644) suggest that the ERF was put in place to increase financial solidarity between Member States and to share the burden more equally. Moraga and Rapoport also note that the ERF might be one step towards “a more solidary union”, but that these measures do not take into account the preferences of the asylum seekers and refugees. Thielemann (2008, 6) concludes that while the ERF has used its funds to compensate countries receiving more applications, it has not succeeded in encouraging Member States with smaller burdens to consent to taking more responsibility. Voluntary responsibility-taking tends to be inefficient because the compensation provided by the ERF fund for each additional asylum seeker does not cover the true costs of the additional asylum seeker (Thielemann 2008, 7).

The ERF has also been criticized of its disproportionate funding, as it was based on the absolute number of asylum seekers and refugees. This means that larger countries receive a relatively larger amount of funding compared with smaller countries with bigger relative burdens, for example, the asylum seeker ratio to population. (Thielemann 2005, 819–820.) Thus, the fund has not contributed to fair sharing of the burden as much

as it could have, were the funds distributed according to relative burdens. An under-achieving fair sharing mechanism demotes the notion of solidarity.

3.3 EU Resettlement Programme

The EU Resettlement Programme is part of the burden-sharing and solidarity programme. The goal of the programme is to resettle recognized refugees in EU Member States. The number of refugees resettled within the EU is rather low compared to countries such as the United States and Canada. This is partly due to the fact that the EU receives considerably more ‘spontaneous asylum seekers’ and most Member States lack a resettlement programme. The ERF plays a large part in funding resettlement programmes and other activities under the EU Resettlement Programme. (European Commission, External Aspects 2015; Decision No 281/2012/EU 2012, 1–2.)

Moraga and Rapoport (2014, 644) argue that “the EU has failed to implement the resettlement programme on a large scale”, despite its crucial role in the burden-sharing mechanism currently in place. For the burden to be shared more equally, the EU Resettlement Programme should complement the Dublin Regulation and support resettlement of refugees in EU Member States, since some Member States are under particular pressure and face a larger burden due to their geographical location (Moraga and Rapoport 2014, 639–647). The European Commission (2017d) has recognised this problem and the CEAS reform proposal suggests that an allocation programme should be integrated into the Dublin Regulation.

One of the main flaws in the EU Resettlement Programme is that it only resettles recognized refugees and the number of recognized refugees is relatively small (Djajic 2014, 83). Djajic (2014, 92) argues that some individuals have a better chance at receiving refuge if they arrive by means of questionable and often illegal methods. This highlights a sub-optimal level of usage of the EU Resettlement Programme. Integrating the allocation system into the Dublin Regulation would make the resettlement programme more efficient, as allocation of refugees can be done at the same time as the application is received. (European Commission 2017d.)

3.4 Directive on Temporary Protection

The EU recognized the need for preparation of mass influxes of displaced persons long before the 2015 refugee crisis. The temporary protection directive was established in the aftermath of the 1990s conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Kosovo. The temporary protection directive is defined as an ‘exceptional measure’ to provide people temporary and

immediate protection. It was initially created to cope with mass influx cases where the CEAS could not cope with the number of claims being lodged. The temporary protection directive allows a certain group to be classified as eligible for temporary protection without further assessments. (European Commission 2016.)

So far, the directive has not been implemented in the 2015 crisis and its aftermath. Some reasons for non-implementation are uncoordinated responses of Member States and lack of agreed indicators for measuring what counts as ‘pressure’ or ‘mass influx’. (European Commission 2016b, 3–4.)

Generally, the temporary protection directive in its current form cannot be regarded as very successful. The European Commission (2016b, 1) itself notes that the implementation of the temporary protection directive has been inconsistent and policies in Member States ‘highly discretionary’ already during the 1990s conflicts. On the other hand, the European Commission (2016b, 2) notes that the temporary protection directive has a solidarity system already embedded in it. The countries responding to the crisis are subsidized through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund. Receiving displaced persons is still a voluntary action, though, and thus creates weaknesses in the implementation of the directive. (European Commission 2016b, 1–2.) The temporary protection directive can therefore be seen as an effort to create a multi-dimensional soft mechanism for burden-sharing in the EU. As can be concluded from the overview of the current legislation, the EU has a variety of tools to address the issue. The next chapter will take a look at the existing theory on international burden-sharing mechanisms.

4 INTERNATIONAL BURDEN-SHARING MECHANISMS

Thielemann (2008, 3) defines two main regimes of international burden-sharing: one-dimensional and multi-dimensional regimes. These regimes are then divided into mechanisms according to the required level of imperativeness of the mechanisms. Thielemann (2008, 3) describes the level of imperativeness by hard (imperative) and soft (voluntary). Examples of these mechanisms are shown below in Table 1, which has been modified from Thielemann's (2008, 3) original table by adding examples proposed by Thielemann (2008, 3–8).

Table 1 International burden-sharing mechanisms (adopted from Thielemann 2008, 3).

	One-dimensional	Multi-dimensional
Hard	Binding rules, redistributive quotas	Explicit compensation
Soft	Voluntary pledging, temporary protection	Implicit trade, proactive and reactive measures

As can be seen from table 1, one-dimensional imperative mechanisms are for example binding rules (Thielemann 2008, 3). Binding rules are a hard, imperative action, in which all Member States need to take part on equal terms. One-dimensional soft mechanisms can be for example voluntary pledging programmes. The amount of responsibility taken by a Member States is partly voluntary-based. Multi-dimensional mechanisms are also divided into hard and soft ones. Explicit compensations are seen as a hard mechanism, while implicit trade is seen as a soft mechanism. Thielemann (2008, 4) understands explicit compensation to denote mechanisms where countries can trade their quota of the burden for money or a similar good. On the other hand, in Thielemann's (2008, 4) terms, implicit trade refers to a method where countries can contribute either in a proactive or reactive way. (Thielemann 2008, 3–4.)

4.1 One-dimensional mechanisms

4.1.1 *Hard one-dimensional mechanisms*

As previously discussed, an example of one-dimensional hard mechanisms is binding policies (Thielemann 2008, 3). The intention of common policies is to reduce the amount

of corrective actions needed (Thielemann 2008, 3) and to ensure all asylum seekers and refugees receive equal treatment in every EU Member State; in other words, to prevent a certain Member State from appearing more appealing than others, which helps equalize asylum seeker flows. Policy harmonisation is, according to Thielemann (2008, 3), also an example of a one-dimensional imperative mechanism. Thus, it can be argued that the current (2015) harmonisation and revision of policies that the EU has agreed on is a one-dimensional imperative mechanism.

Another example of a one-dimensional hard mechanism is the method of redistributive quotas, where a certain party decides upon a distribution of quotas between the Member States (Thielemann 2008, 3). The idea behind redistributive quotas is to equalize the burden of each Member State. The EU Resettlement Programme can also be seen as an example of such a mechanism. The EU Resettlement Programme serves to balance inequities between EU Member States (Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 644).

4.1.2 *Soft one-dimensional mechanisms*

An example of a one-dimensional soft mechanism is a voluntary pledging system, where countries with smaller burdens can assist countries with larger burdens. This kind of mechanism is usually applied when a quota cannot be agreed upon and/or a crisis strikes. The voluntary pledging system was used for example during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. The UNHCR encouraged countries to aid in hosting the refugees of the crisis to alleviate the pressure faced by the countries with external borders with Kosovo. (Thielemann 2008, 3–4).

Thielemann (2008, 4) suggests that the EU Council Directive on Temporary Protection in the Case of Mass Influx is an example of a one-dimensional soft mechanism. The Directive (2001/55/EC) aims to put in place “an exceptional scheme to deal with possible cases of mass arrivals in the European Union (EU) of foreign nationals who cannot return to their countries, in particular due to a war, violence or human rights violations. The legislation puts in place immediate temporary protection for these displaced persons and promotes a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving them and bearing the consequences of such reception.” (Council Directive 2001/55/EC Summary, 1). The intention is to decrease the bureaucracy of granting asylum if it is clear that a certain group of people is in need of temporary protection. The Directive is a soft mechanism because Member States participating in it can estimate their capacity for receiving persons in need of temporary protection and can voluntarily take in more people if they wish to do so. (Council Directive 2001/55/EC, Chapter VI, article 25). If the Directive were ever to be applied, it would be a one-dimensional soft mechanism, because the number of asylum seekers and refugees is the only dimension and the mechanism is based on voluntariness.

4.2 Multi-dimensional mechanisms

4.2.1 *Hard multi-dimensional mechanisms*

As the name suggests, multi-dimensional mechanisms aim to take into account more than one dimension when distributing the burden. An example of a multi-dimensional hard mechanism would be for example a trade system similar to the Kyoto emission trading scheme. Participating countries would be able to exchange their share of the burden for money or a similar good. It would incorporate a market-based solution, which takes into account the cost efficiency of hosting an asylum seeker or a refugee. This way the market would allocate the hosting of asylum seekers and refugees to places where it is the most cost-efficient. Such a system was suggested by Peter Schuck in 1997. (Thielemann 2008, 3; Schuck 1997). Schuck's proposal (1997, 297) is to create a system that is regionally based, commonly agreed on and would consist of a market with an option to trade. Schuck's (1997, 269, 297) model's goals are, for example, to maximize resources by market allocation, to make a model that is simple to apply and to take into account human rights issues and to improve the quality of protection. Schuck's (1997, 246) model is based on the assumption that the number of refugees is a given, which means it does not account for preventive measures.

Thielemann (2008, 5) recognizes the European Refugee Fund (ERF) as a multi-dimensional burden-sharing mechanism, as it allocates funds to countries receiving the largest numbers of refugees and displaced people. As previously noted, the ERFs funds do not currently cover the real costs of an asylum seeker (Thielemann 2008, 7). Consequently, the ERF is incapable of functioning as an effective trade instigator, because market participation is not rational in economic terms (Thielemann 2008, 7–8; Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 650–653).

4.2.2 *Soft multi-dimensional mechanisms*

Multi-dimensional soft mechanisms are mechanisms that take into account a wider range of operations that can be seen to ease the burden (Thielemann 2008, 4). This means that both proactive and reactive measures are taken into account when dividing the burden. Proactive measures are actions taken beforehand and in order to “halt the escalation of potential refugee problems” (Thielemann 2008, 4). Reactive methods are those which we usually define as measures taken to lighten the burden, such as hosting refugees. (Thielemann 2008, 4.)

A multi-dimensional soft mechanism would be for example, implicit trade, which would take into account both proactive and reactive measures. As Thielemann (2008, 7) implies, explicit trade systems such as ones similar to the Kyoto emission scheme have been heavily criticized. According to Thielemann (2008, 7), implicit systems, instead, would take into account each country's comparative advantage and make the system more effective.

By taking into account each country's comparative advantages, whether it be in proactive measures such as peacekeeping operations or in reactive measures such as hosting asylum seekers and refugees, the mechanism would allocate resources where they can be most effectively used. For example, a country with a large army and experience in peacekeeping missions can be expected to be much more efficient in peacekeeping measures and show a higher success rate than would a country with a small or no army. The same applies to reactive measures, i.e. countries which already have well-established, working asylum seeker and refugee reception programmes are much better placed to successfully handle asylum claims within appropriate time frames than countries with no specific infrastructure or experience in handling asylum claims. (Thielemann 2008, 7.) Mueller-Using and Vöpel (2014, 97) also suggest that improving living conditions in the countries of origin will decrease the number of economic migrants, who according to Hatton (2009, 183) often apply for asylum, thus improving living conditions could decrease the total number of asylum applications. This has been proven to be true, as Engelen (2015, 29) notes that cuts in humanitarian aid in the refugee camps increased migrant flows to the European Union.

Specializing in a country-specific strength also has political implications. Thielemann (2008, 8) uses post-war Germany as an example. Due to its historical legacy, Germany has often chosen to avoid 'out of area' military interventions, and has instead focused on a policy of non-intervention, contributing instead by for example accepting large amounts of asylum seekers and refugees. Engelen (2015, 28) even argues that individual politicians' careers can be affected by the chosen approach to a crisis. The British and the French governments, which actively participate in peacekeeping missions, have requested that their efforts be taken into account when burdens are being divided between the Member States (Council resolution 1995, 95/C 262/01). Lavenex's (2001, 870) conclusion that European refugee policies will most likely move towards prevention-oriented policies due to EU's significant political and economic role, supports the argument of incorporating proactive measures as part of the burden-sharing responsibilities.

Thielemann (2008, 8) argues that the distribution of the burden is unequitable when looking at proactive or reactive measures alone. On the other hand, when looking at it as a whole, one can see that countries naturally contribute more to the actions, whether proactive or reactive, in which they are most effective. Thus, it can be argued, contrary to the

established interpretation, that the burden is in effect not as unevenly distributed as is generally claimed.

A multi-dimensional soft mechanism would offer Member States a chance to contribute to the issue by means of measures that they can politically justify and to use their experience and existing infrastructure. The voluntariness of the mechanism consists of the choice of contributing proactively and/or reactively. An implicit trade between proactive and reactive measures makes it possible to allocate resources where they are most effectively used and to distribute the burden more equally between the Member States. (Thielemann 2008, 3–8.)

The current existing Directive on Temporary Protection can be viewed as multi-dimensional since it uses explicit financial compensation when activated. Multi-dimensional soft mechanisms are usually based on implicit compensation systems. Even though the compensation is explicit rather than implicit the Directive on Temporary Protection can be seen as a soft mechanism, because it is based on voluntariness. The European Commission (2016b, 6–7) suggests a few ways of developing the directive. Firstly, the definition of a mass influx should be made into a non-exhaustive list, which would clarify and enhance its functionality. Secondly, cooperation between institutions, agencies and Member States could be streamlined and the rights of asylum seekers could be aligned. Lastly, the Commission suggests that a mandatory automatic relocation system without voluntarism be introduced. This would make the mechanism more binding and harder and it could be considered as a multi-dimensional hard mechanism.

5 RESEARCH DESIGN

5.1 Content analysis as a research method

This research has been conducted as a qualitative content analysis. A qualitative method has been chosen, because the research question is a complex one and of an interpretative nature. There are no set definitions for a burden or for what is equitable. These are terms which will be explored and defined within the framework of this thesis to allow the richness of these terms to be exploited, but at the same time ensure consistency throughout the research. These terms will be explored in the following chapters and the definitions will lay the ground for the content analysis.

Qualitative content analysis has been chosen as a research method because it is well equipped to recognise trends, patterns and differences in large pools of data (Krippendorff 1967, 34–36). Qualitative content analysis is able to describe the collected data only if the right questions are posed. It is not equipped to analyse the data from each and every aspect, but rather offers the researcher the ability to use a vast amount of data for specific questions, as it is well equipped to reduce data into information. (Schreier 2012, 3–4.) As the research question is of a complex nature, qualitative content analysis fits the requirements well. In this case, it allows the researcher to specify the research angle through the research question. In this thesis, the research question is focused on burden-sharing methods, reasonings and prerequisites for a system. The qualitative content analysis method enables the use of a mass amount of data to answer these questions, with the aim of receiving a holistic understanding of the questions and the available options. Schreier (2012, 8) notes that using qualitative content analysis may lead to loss of information on the individual level, but in exchange the research gains information on an aggregate level. In the terms of this study it means that even though a single method, reasoning or prerequisite might be missed or not researched, the study will give a more thorough understanding of the totality of the data and the topic.

The chosen method is always partly data-driven, which means that the collected data will influence the possibilities of the content analysis and set the framework for it. This research also exploits existing theory as a base for the research. This qualitative content analysis was using the following phases:

1. Selecting and collecting data
2. Building a coding frame around the theory
3. Coding the data into units of coding
4. Testing the coding frame
5. Modifying the coding frame if necessary
6. Analysing the data from the content analysis

The specific methods of data collection and conducting the content analysis are explored in the following sections.

With the aid of the qualitative content analysis, this research attempted to answer the research question of how the issue of burden-sharing should be addressed in the EU post 2015. The research also attempted to identify reasons for addressing the issue and prerequisites for a working mechanism. The results of the content analysis were analysed, and possible mechanisms were compared and contrasted with the current legislation and systems in order to evaluate their potential. The following sections will cover the research process from data collection to the actual content analysis including an evaluation of the study, whilst the subsequent chapters will discuss the results of the content analysis.

5.2 Data collection

Qualitative data has been chosen for this research because, within this topic, qualitative data is more available and better describes the phenomenon. Qualitative data is also more suitable for broadening understanding of the topic, which is the aim of the research question, rather than to use quantitative data to test a particular theory, for example.

For this research, data was collected only from academic sources to make sure only studies conducted in an equivalent manner are included. The data was gathered from two big academic article databases, EBSCO and ProQuest. These two were chosen for a number of reasons. One reason is that these academic source databases were available to the researcher. Another reason is that, even though only two academic source databases were used, they are among the largest academic journal databases in the world. The chosen databases have been ranked as number one and two on the University of Wisconsin-Madison library of top 10 databases (University of Wisconsin-Madison 2018). These two largest databases have been selected alone because testing showed that adding smaller databases would not produce any new, relevant data, as articles found in smaller databases were already included in the two databases that were chosen.

In order to maintain the focus on the research question and the mechanisms, the data collection was conducted in the ProQuest as whole (Business database) and within EBSCO, in the EBSCO Business Source Complete. Tests were conducted to see whether the data from EBSCO Complete should be included, but it was discarded from this research due to low suitability for this research. EBSCO Complete is a database which covers all the data available in the database, including the data classified under EBSCO Business Source Complete. Most of the data generated from EBSCO Complete, which were not found from EBSCO Business Source Complete, covered areas such as cultural adaptation, spreading of diseases and language studies. Thus, EBSCO Complete was discarded as it

failed to offer added value compared to EBSCO Business Source Complete in this research. Although ProQuest and EBSCO Business Source Complete were chosen as the databases for the data, no limitation to the field of the journals was made. Both databases include journals from various fields, giving the research a wider perspective on the topic.

The data was collected from these two databases in the same way and on the same day. The final update to the data was made on the 11th of July 2018. This means the data collection period was limited to articles published in these two databases before this date. Another criterion was set for the time period of the articles to narrow down the most suitable articles for the data. The research question researches the mechanisms for a system to resolve the issue of burden-sharing. As 'the issue' is understood as the aftermath of the refugee crisis of 2015, the time period was limited to articles published after 2015.

To maintain the quality of the data and to narrow down the amount of data, only academic articles were chosen as data. In addition to this, the results were narrowed down to only peer-reviewed articles to ensure that only the most respected and trustworthy articles were included in the research. Due to language constraints, the data search was narrowed down to articles published in English or Finnish. No Finnish articles were found, and this criterion was discarded as ineffectual.

After these parameters were in place, it was time to set the search words. The criteria for the search words were that (1) they should cover all possible articles that can address the research question, (2) they should not exclude any viable articles and (3) they should narrow down the results to an amount which is workable within this research. Some key search words were initially tested alone, but the results varied too much and there were too many articles. To narrow down and to find more suitable articles, key search words were combined. The key search words tested included 'refugee', 'European Union', 'crisis', 'EU', 'international' and 'Europe'. For this research, the two combined search words chosen were 'refugee' and 'European Union'. The word 'refugee' was chosen, because it narrowed down the search to articles mostly covering this topic and the other search word, 'European Union', was added to limit the search in a geographical way to the area where the recent crisis took place. The European Union was chosen as a region of focus because the recent refugee crisis has affected the region significantly and the European Union as a receiving region has been explored from many different angles offering me the chance to research existing theories from many perspectives.

The search was conducted by using the Boolean search method with refugee AND European Union. The search was conducted in all parts of the text, title, key words and full text, meaning that both these words had to appear somewhere in the text but did not have to be in the title or the key words necessarily. After conducting a search using these parameters, EBSCO generated 415 articles and ProQuest 264, totalling 679 articles. These results were cross-referenced and after removing identical articles, 558 articles remained in total. Figure 6 shows how the data collection phase moved forward.




Figure 6 Pyramid chart of the data collection process

Figure 6 depicts a pyramid chart of the of narrowing down the data. After the initial search for data was completed, the data was sorted according to title and summaries to see whether the article covered the desired topic. Articles which remained in the search results but discussed topics which were not related to this research were discarded. These included articles that addressed different issues, for example, infectious diseases in refugee populations or conditions in refugee camps. As figure 4 shows, 237 articles remained after the title and summary phase. The next phase was a closer examination of the articles. During this phase, 32 articles had to be discarded due to lack of availability from sources available to the researcher for this research. The remaining and available articles were all read through and during this process 52 articles were discarded because they did not address the research question. These were articles that initially (title & summary) seemed indicate they discuss the issue but failed to do so. These were mostly articles which touched upon the subject, but were focused on an entirely different matter, for example a specific political person, article of a law or disease. These articles did not offer any pre-requisites or methods and were therefore discarded.

After reading all the articles and discarding the ones which did not address the subject of this thesis, the remaining 153 were examined and coded according to the codes explained in chapter 2.3. During the examination phase, an additional 94 articles had to be

discarded as not suitable and not addressing the research question (burden-sharing methods) of this thesis. These included, for example, articles which analysed the failings of the current system, but did not suggest any other methods/prerequisites or articles which were limited to analysing a specific non-related issue, such as the political environment. Articles were only included in the final set of the data if they could answer at least some of the questions posed in the coding frame, which will be explained in detail in the following chapter. In total 59 (see Annex 1) out of the initial 558 articles formed the final set of data.

5.3 Building a coding frame and conducting a content analysis

In this content analysis, academic journals were analysed using a qualitative content analysis method. The topic has been categorized into a coding frame and divided into codes which will be used to analyse the text. The building of a coding frame starts from a ‘wealth of material’, which has been gathered in the data collection phase. The coding frame sets out the main categories that the research focuses on. (Schreier 2012; 1, 58–59.) In this research, the focus is on burden-sharing mechanisms, the reasons and prerequisites for a system. The three main categories are then divided into subcategories of interest, which form the coding frame for the content analysis.

A direct, concept-driven approach is used in this research, meaning that the coding frame has been derived from existing theory on international burden-sharing methods. The coding frame is derived from the classification of international burden-sharing mechanisms by Thielemann (2008,3). This theory has been selected because of its merits and popularity in the field of migration studies. Thielemann’s theory was also chosen because it reflects a theory from the time before the crisis and thus offers a view not based on the current crisis, but rather on a long-term study of the topic. The classification divides methods into one-dimensional and multi-dimensional mechanisms and each of these can be divided into hard or soft mechanisms, reaching a total of four core types of burden-sharing mechanisms (Thielemann 2008,3). The four subcategories for classifying the types of methods are hence as follows:

- One-dimensional hard mechanisms
- One-dimensional soft mechanisms
- Multi-dimensional hard mechanism
- Multi-dimensional soft mechanisms

In addition, the following complimentary questions will be posed to the data collected:

- Why should the issue be addressed?
- What are the prerequisites for a working mechanism?

The subcategories for the two complimentary questions was formed using a data-driven way, because theory was not directly applicable, and a data-driven way offers the research more insight to the rich data. In a data-driven strategy, the subcategories for the main category are formed during the analysis process as they arise from the data (Schreir 2012, 84–90). From the data collected, four subcategories emerged for both supporting research questions.

The coding frame is built according to the prerequisites of a qualitative content analysis expressed by Schreier (2012, 58–84), the key requirements being unidimensionality, mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness, to better ensure reliability and validity of the content analysis process. Unidimensionality is ensured when the categories each reflect only one aspect of the data, in this case burden-sharing methods, reasons and prerequisites. Subcategories must reflect the main categories to guarantee proper analysis, in this research that means the subcategories for burden-sharing methods must be types of burden-sharing methods. Mutual exclusiveness refers to the units of coding to be able to be classified under only one of the categories (Shreier 2012, 75). This is ensured in this research by dividing the categories into three different questions that complement one another, but the same answers cannot fit into more than one category. Exhaustiveness is referred to as the ability to assign each unit of coding to at least one subcategory (Schreier 2012, 76). In this research, the main category of burden-sharing methods is based on Thielemann's classification, which is inclusive and can categorize all types of methods. The exhaustiveness of the two other main categories is ensured by using a data-driven method to determine the subcategories.

The coding frame was built using three dimensions and two hierarchical levels. The three dimensions are the three main categories and the two levels consist of the subcategories. To ensure exhaustiveness, a level of YES/NO questions was added to each main category, as vital data could have been lost if the criteria were set to data which answered all three questions rather than to all the data which answers one or more of the questions. Each main category is thus divided into a first level of YES/NO, which refers to whether the data in hand addresses the issue, and if the answer is yes, the response the data gives is classified under one of the subcategories presented under the YES-option. Thus, taking into careful consideration the formation of the coding frame, the completed coding frame for this research is depicted in figure 7.

Reasons for addressing the issue

- NO
- YES
 - 2015 crisis
 - Inadequacy of the current system
 - Economic issues
 - Environmental issues
 - Demographic changes
 - other

Prerequisites for a working method

- NO
- YES
 - Border control
 - Supranational governance
 - Burden-sharing
 - other

Burden-sharing mechanisms

- NO
- YES
 - one-dimensional soft mechanisms
 - one-dimensional hard mechanisms
 - multi-dimensional soft mechanisms
 - multi-dimensional hard mechanisms

Figure 7 Coding frame for the analysed articles

Figure 7 shows the coding frame in the form of a questionnaire. This coding frame questionnaire was then used to analyse the unit of analysis, which in this research consists of articles gathered in the data collection phase. Each article was analysed individually and the units of coding, which are according to Schreier (2012, 131), defined as the parts of the data which give the answer to the questions posed by the coding frame, were recognised, marked and coded. The articles were colour-coded: the reasons expressed in each article were highlighted in yellow, the prerequisites in green and the burden-sharing mechanisms in red. In addition to marking the units of coding in each article, also the units of context were analysed to fully comprehend the meaning of the units of coding. The units of context are the portion of data surrounding the units of coding, which enable the researcher to understand the material (Schreier 2012, 133).

5.4 Evaluation of the study

Evaluating a qualitative study is often complex. Since a qualitative method gives the researcher more flexibility it also allows for more potential differences in interpretation. The most efficient way to overcome the problems qualitative methods can cause is to report the research, analysis and results as meticulously as possible. Since data-driven content analysis is flexible, the results and evaluation of this study can be affected by the researcher's perceptions and interpretations of the data and the literature.

Qualitative researches can be evaluated using different criteria. The trustworthiness of this research is evaluated by criteria developed by Lincoln and Guba (1985). The first criterion assessed is credibility, which can be built through prolonged engagement, triangulation and persistent observation. This research made use of prolonged engagement and persistent observation as all articles studied were published during and after the crisis year 2015. The results were analysed through a burden-sharing theory developed before the crisis and the results were contrasted with the existing theory. The research was narrowed down to the analysis of only academic articles, which inherently limits triangulation opportunities. This research made use of two of the biggest academic databases, which contain the majority of published articles. This indicates that further triangulation to other databases would probably not have yielded different results, as these two databases already produced 91 duplicates. On the other hand, further triangulation and broadening the scope of the data to include, for example, interviews and analysis of institutional documents and meeting memos could yield interesting results.

According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), transferability of the research question is defined as the ability to apply the results in another context. In this research, the studied area is very limited (the EU), but the criteria, and thus the research question, could be applied uniformly to any limited area. As this research focused on academic output motivated by the current crisis, the research question could be transferred to the neighbouring countries (for example Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) individually just as well. Transferability of the research question, though limited, exists in the area studied.

Dependability is a criterion that assesses the consistency of the results and how well another researcher could generate the same results using the same data. In this research, dependability is quite high but faces certain restrictions due to the nature of the qualitative research method. For example, the coding process is very dependable, as the process is described meticulously and it is straightforward. The analysis of the unit of coding, on the other hand, is not as dependable since the perceptions of the researcher might affect the analysis and conclusions drawn from the data. By recording and clearly demonstrating how and why things were analysed the way they were, this research seeks ensure dependability. The results have been presented in a way that allows for both supportive and un-supportive arguments to be voiced.

The last criterion mentioned by Lincoln and Guba (1985) is confirmability. Confirmability is the analysis of the credibility of the sources of data. In this research, it means understanding and analysing the articles and the background to them and assessing the credibility of the articles. As previously mentioned in the data collection phase, careful attention was paid to safeguard the credibility of the data. Thus, only peer-reviewed academic articles were included in the data collection process. This ensures better confirmability of the results. However, as this research was conducted partly in the form of a data-driven content analysis, it must be taken into consideration that the interpretations made by the researcher might affect the findings. This research aims at voicing the data, thus carefully analysing the articles to include all the messages conveyed by them and to refrain from overanalysing the articles. All in all, this study adheres to the trustworthiness criteria expressed by Lincoln and Guba (1985) fairly well by addressing the issues of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. The results of this research can therefore be valued as acceptably trustworthy.

However, there are some limitations to the study. Firstly, as the 2015 crisis has been a predominant driver for research of various EU-oriented methods, the research focused on the EU's point of view. The articles analysed were all in English, which might contribute to an Anglo-Saxon analysis of the issue. On the other hand, English is the predominant language of international research, so the results of this content analysis would probably not differ markedly even if multiple languages were added as search criteria.

Secondly, though the availability of the data used is respectable, new researches are conducted constantly, meaning the data grows as we speak. A bigger pool of data offers more possibilities but at the same time limits the use of the findings of this research in the long run, as they become a mere snippet of all the studies related to the issue published post 2015. As only peer-reviewed articles were used as data for this research, it limits the possibilities of alternative suggestions proposed in other forums. Though this study is limited to the academics of the issue, alternative forums could offer more innovative solutions desperately called for by academics.

Thirdly and lastly, emphasis must be placed on the analysis of the transparency of the chosen analysis method. While the data coding process is easy to describe and account for, thus being easily replicable, the analysis process is more complex. Content analysis is aimed at producing a holistic view rather than a deep understanding of a very specific subject. This means that a deep analysis of each suggested method is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, it focuses on reframing new suggestions within the existing theory and comparing and contrasting the similarities and differences of the methods.

The researcher has no ties or linkages to any refugees or institutions and thus examines the problem from a purely academic perspective as an outsider. Thus, it can be argued that the position of the researcher does not present any major bias on the study. This

ensures objectivity in the analysis of the results. It should be noted, though, that the academic world can sometimes be considered too theoretical for real-life solutions and thus the findings might suffer from a lack of institutional realism.

6 REASONS FOR ADDRESSING THE ISSUE

6.1 The 2015 crisis

The content analysis demonstrated that the 2015 crisis has been a major driver for change and examining possible alternative methods of addressing the issue. Although this was somewhat expected since the study was conducted on research papers published after the crisis, the predominance of the 2015 crisis as the motivation for the studies was stronger than expected. This was demonstrated by the vast amount of references to the crisis: 58 out of 59 articles studied mentioned the 2015 crisis in context as the motivation for the study. Very often the articles mentioned the 2015 crisis in the very first sentences, most often already in the abstract.

An interesting observation made on the basis of the articles is that not all articles agreed that 2015 should be called a year of crisis or, in general, a migrant crisis. For example, Morsut and Kruke (2017, 145) referred to the situation as a ‘so-called 2015 migrant and refugee crisis in Europe’. The term crisis is certainly contested in academic literature, even though all articles concurred that the current situation has been particularly different to preceding years. The articles demonstrated that the year 2015 should not be considered a ‘one-off’ and maybe that it is the reason it should not necessarily be called the 2015 crisis. Some authors, such as Carlsen (2017, 1148) and Stenschke (2017, 91), noted that the current situation is only the beginning and might even be the new normal, as possible future waves of refugees and migrants make their way to Europe. Dustmann et al. (2017, 534) concurred with the idea of the 2015 crisis being only a prelude and suggested that future migration and asylum seeker waves will come from Africa and the Middle East due to their vastly growing population and risk of conflict in the regions.

It could be clearly concluded from the articles that the 2015 crisis, or better referred to as the changed circumstances of 2015, sparked a new interest in the field of migration and refugee burden-sharing studies. The year 2015 has acted as a catalyst for innovative and alternative research, as the articles demonstrated. There is no clear-cut and simple answer to this question, and the suggestions made in the articles that were analysed varied from one extreme to the other, even though they all based their reasoning on the same situation. This only goes to show that the problem is clearly recognized and all parties seem to be in agreement that it needs a solution, just that the answers are very different. The 2015 crisis was, as expected, the common denominator for all the articles studied.

6.2 Flaws in the current mechanism

As expected, the 2015 crisis was a common denominator in almost all of the articles studied. Another common denominator that was anticipated was basing the reasoning on the flaws or inadequacies in the current system, the CEAS. This was expected because often change is due when the existing system is deemed inadequate. Criticisms of the current system were predominantly present in most articles, but surprisingly not all articles that reasoned their study on the basis of the 2015 crisis criticized the current method as unworkable.

Thym (2016, 1546) noted that the 2015 crisis has revealed ‘structural deficiencies’ in the current mechanism and such a system will not be able to cope with future waves of refugees and migrants. On the contrary, the CEAS was often seen as an appropriate method for its time, but the changing future requires a changed method. Structural deficiencies were referred to in many articles, mainly within the concept of fair and realistic distribution. For example, Carlsen (2017, 1148), Angenendt et al. (2016, 29) and Angeloni and Spano (2018, 477) note that the current mechanism is unfair, and the system should aim at greater sharing of responsibility. Unfair distribution due to geographical location is a major issue and geography should not be the only driver in distributing refugees (Carlsen 2017, 1148). Türk (2016, 57) calls the current system a ‘crisis of accountability and solidarity’ system. Most of the critique was addressed at the so-called Dublin Regulation I–IV. It was seen as the source of inequitable distribution and burden-sharing in the EU, because it defines the state responsible according to first entry, which is often linked with geography (Jones & Teytelboym 2016, 80). A concrete example of the inadequacy of the Dublin Regulation was when German Chancellor Angela Merkel temporarily suspended the Dublin Regulation in August 2015 in Germany (Fullerton 2016, 130).

As Dublin Regulations were built to even out the distribution of refugees in the EU through the relocation method, it was in fact designed to address the issue of unequal burdens. This relocation scheme also faces heavy criticism, as the Commission itself has reported that only 25 percent of planned relocations have been executed. (Niemann & Zaun 2018, 7). Perusel (2015, 134) concurs and adds that as long as there is a lack of solidarity the Dublin system will not work. Hansen and Randeira (2018, 994) assess that the Dublin system cannot work under the current area of free movement.

Some articles gave heavy critique to the current system as ‘failing itself, failing refugees and failing humanity’ (Van Selm 2016, 60). The failings, especially when it comes to the human rights aspect of the current system, were referenced multiple times (see for example Fullerton 2016, 57; Collet 2016, 40; Hatton 2017, 449). The outlook on the human rights issues varied. Hatton (2017, 449) suggests that the current system encourages

people to make ‘hazardous maritime or overland crossings’ and critiques that the current system cannot provide a prospect of gaining refugee status before taking this trip.

Fullerton (2016, 57), on the other hand, criticizes the differences in the national asylum systems and conditions, which vary between Member States. Human rights issues were also referenced in the cases of the policy on *non-refoulement* (principle on the returns of refugees and asylum seekers) and the categorization of ‘safe countries of origin’. These issues are not further discussed in this research as they are outside the scope of this thesis, because they are related to situations when a refugee status is not granted, and asylum is denied.

6.3 Addressing megatrends

6.3.1 *Economic issues*

Interestingly, the 2015 crisis and the flaws in the current system were not the only reasons for addressing the issue. A general consensus in the articles studied was that the issue is not one of a kind and the future might look a lot different than the past. This is why other reasons for addressing the issue also arose. Through the data-driven coding process, where the units of analysis formed the final coding frame, megatrends such as economic and environmental issues as well as demographic changes rose as a category for reasons for addressing the issue.

Economic issues were often seen as a way to address the root problem in the countries of origin (see for example Agenendt et al. 2016, 29 and Stenschke 2017, 94). Dustmann et al. (2017, 534) noted that ‘less than average economic development’ can be a root cause for future refugee migration waves. Problems in economic developments were seen as root causes especially for asylum seekers, who might in the end be denied asylum and labelled as economic migrants.

Economic issues could also be addressed from the other side of the table, from the perspective of EU funding. Tudor (2015), for example, saw the flaws in the current funding schemes as a reason to change the system or the funding of the system. EU funding spent on prevention of refugee migration should not only be aimed at solving the direct situations but also focus on the economic gaps between less developed and developed countries. Issues that could be addressed through EU financing could be poverty, governance, jobs, peace, security and human rights, for example. Addressing these issues preemptively could lower the pressure to relocate and apply for asylum in the EU. (Tudor 2015, 74).

6.3.2 *Environmental issues*

A noteworthy result from the content analysis is that environmental refugees were also mentioned (Carlsen 2017, 1148). The term environmental refugee is a difficult concept, because international law recognizes refugees as people who face ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ (Geneva convention 1951). As one can note, environmental issues are not within the scope of the definition. Thus, ‘environmental refugee’ does not yet exist in international law, but perhaps the increasing use and need for the term could be a driver for reconsidering the definition of a refugee. Katz (2017, 303) suggests that the definition of a refugee should be clarified due to the lack of consistency in the handling of asylum applications within the EU. The variability of implementation is also noted by Türk (2016, 57) as a problem.

Other researchers refer to the same issue of Carlsen’s definition of an environmental refugee (a person seeking asylum due to environmental issues in his/her country of origin) as the problem of mounting migration due to environmental reasons. Benedikter (2017; 445, 458) notes that mass migration from Africa to Europe should be addressed by aiding African nations’ development to a more sustainable level, environmentally, economically and politically. Angenendt et al. (2016, 29) also note that climate change is a driver for migration in developing countries, and climate change mitigation can provide solutions to the issue. Angeloni & Spano (2018, 474) and Dustmann et al. (2017, 534) mention climate change and global warming as a possible reason for future migratory waves.

6.3.3 *Demographic changes*

Demographic changes were brought up as a reason for addressing the issue, as the population of the world is expected to increase, especially in Africa and the Middle East. The UN’s World Population Prospects estimates that the total population of the world will increase by over 1.1 billion persons by 2035. The population increase is mainly expected to be in the less developed regions of the world, where the population is estimated to grow by 1 billion. (United Nations 2018.) As can be seen from the data, the general population growth is concentrated in areas from where people make the move to the EU to seek asylum.

Even if the Syrian war were to eventually end, Brenke (2015, 22) expects that the asylum seeker flows will not decrease because the population is growing at such a high rate. Rapid population growth increases economic and environmental issues especially in less developed countries, particularly in Africa, where countries are already facing tremendous population growth – leading to people seeking asylum and basic needs in other

parts of the world, including the EU. As a general observation, it can be noted that throughout history high population growth also often triggers internal conflicts, which again contributes to asylum seeker flows. (Brenke 2015.)

6.4 From security and integration issues to discourse challenges

For the most part, the articles referred to the earlier-mentioned reasons for addressing the issue. Some additional reasons were given during the analysis process, but they were not significant enough to form individual categories. These included issues such as upholding Union values (Emiliani 2017, 27), rule of law issues (Emiliani 2017, 27; Angenendt et al. 2016, 30) and the crisis of European integration (Bauböck 2018, 141).

Security and terrorist threats, which are often present in the media, were also mentioned in some articles. Angenendt et al. (2016, 30) noted that internal security of the EU is a reason to address the issue and Metzel and Lorenzen (2017, 51) noted that security and terrorist threats should be taken into account, as criminal organisations take advantage of the refugee population inside the EU. Bagdonas (2017, 20–26) argues that the only way to guarantee the security of the EU is to remain together and integrated, as escalated disagreements lead to Member States using their sovereign power to erect walls and close borders.

Another noteworthy reason to address the problem was to change the discourse of asylum seeking and refuge. El-Enany (2015, 8–9) argues that history, especially European history, shows that moving to another country when faced with persecution, poverty or other reasons has always been the norm. In fact, implementing immigration controls in Europe is a fairly new standard. The current discourse on sovereign national states with immigration control limits the ‘emergence of any alternative to restriction’, and thus researching other options becomes restricted. (El-Enany 2015, 8–9.) Other researches such as Stenschke (2017, 94) also brought up history as an example of non-restrictive migration policies. Nearly a quarter of a million French Huguenots sought asylum in Europe before and after 1685. Instead of burdening host countries, they made economic contributions and benefitted the receiving areas. (Stenschke 2017, 94.) Hansen and Randeira (2018, 994) note that currently non-restrictive policies are welcomed more generally by universities and businesses.

Even though the analysis showed that the 2015 crisis is indeed a catalyst for research and a common denominator, the reasons for addressing the issue vary considerably. It can be concluded that the 2015 crisis has acted as a lighter to spark present-day research, but the underlying reasons for the need to address the issue are much more heterogenic, varying from dealing with megatrends to security issues and to changing the discourse from

problem-oriented to opportunity-oriented. The next chapter, in turn, will analyse the pre-requisites proposed for a working method.

7 PREREQUISITES FOR THE SYSTEM

The next item in the coding frame was prerequisites for a system. Unlike the reasons where a common denominator could be found, the prerequisites varied a lot. Not surprisingly, because prerequisites are often linked to the suggestions of a working method, and different methods require different circumstances. In this section, the analysis was focused on the general prerequisites proposed, rather than the specific detailed prerequisites of each proposed mechanism, which will be discussed in the next chapter. The prerequisites that arose from the coding of the articles were subcategorized into four categories: border control, supranational governance, burden-sharing schemes and other prerequisites. The prerequisites that were found in the coding phase were gathered and analysed and they formed, according to their frequency, the above-mentioned subcategories.

7.1 Border control

Border control, in particular, was a very controversial prerequisite, some arguing for strict border control and some for banishing border control altogether. Hatton (2017, 474–475), for example, argues for border control to be enforced and tightened in order for any system to function. The need for enforced border control is argued to ‘limit the policy backlash arising from public concerns’ and to please the public opinion. It is also argued to be a feasible solution on a practical level and the ‘successful’ border control efforts made by Australia were referenced. (Hatton 2017; 474, 479; Ayre 2016). The strict border control of Australia has indeed been successful in minimizing irregular maritime arrivals, but it has been financially tremendously expensive to maintain (Ayre 2016, 77).

Many articles also argued for enforced border control in order to mitigate crime and smuggling (see for example Tudor 2015, 74; Stavropoulou 2016, 7). Border control is seen as justified in mitigating human smuggling, because stronger, enforced and stricter border control decreases the marker for human smuggling as the probability of reaching the EU decreases. This has also been used to argue the case for the Australian no-boat entry immigration policy (Ayre 2016, 77.) Stavropoulou (2016, 7) believes that ‘protection-sensitive border control’ is not possible and suggests that the only way to combat crime and smuggling is by means of enforced sea border control. However, Stavropoulou (2016, 7) notes that these actions in the case of the Mediterranean are often illegal according to EU law. Enforced border control has also been linked to the darkest times in European history (Menendez 2016, 416). Thus, enforced border control, even if efficient, might not be a viable option.

An opposing way to combat human smuggling and to decrease black-market demand would be to provide legal pathways to the EU. This could be done, for example, by issuing

humanitarian visas of the kind issued by Brazil. These are visas which allow asylum seekers to enter the country legally to apply for asylum. Legal travel opportunities would decrease the market for illegal routes. Another approach is the one often referred to as the UK model, which insists that refugees are selected from refugee camps from outside the EU and then relocated within the EU. In order for this method to be successful, the relocation rates should be high enough to discourage people from trying to enter the EU illegally. However, the current relocation rates do not encourage asylum seekers to remain in camps outside the EU. (Costello 2016, 13.)

Tinker (2016, 411) offers a midway path to border control, by suggesting that firstly the asylum seeker and immigration screening procedures should be better harmonized and implemented on an EU level, rather than Member States deciding independently whether to keep their borders open or to close them. A centralized screening location could also be a part of a solution for a working system (Tinker 2016, 411). Van Selm (2016, 62) also offers a less polarized view by suggesting that border control be left to the level of national decision-making and could be addressed by bilateral and multilateral agreements with neighbouring countries.

The border control issue is polarized, with some arguing for closing the borders and some insisting on keeping them open or even granting more ways of entering the EU legally. Both aim at the same result of solving the refugee and asylum-seeker issue but address it from very different angles. Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that neither enforced nor a more open border control policy is an absolute prerequisite for a working system, as either can be argued for and against. In addition, the current border control system also seems to be a possibility. The varied results show that the general significance of border control is minor, even though it can be incremental for a specific proposed method.

7.2 Supranational governance

The analysis of the articles clearly illustrated that some sort of common governance is needed as a prerequisite for a working system (see for example Bauböck 2018; Dustmann et al. 2017; Fisseha 2017; Tinker 2016; Hatton 2017). In this section of the analysis, all the suggestions of above-national level governance were taken into account. The suggestions varied from bilateral agreements to EU-level governance and to global governance. A common denominator for the prerequisites of a working system was found in supranational governance, as most articles suggested some sort of supranational governance as a prerequisite for the methods suggested. The Eurobarometer 2015 results support the claim, as EU level governance for asylum and migration issues was supported by 72.6

percent of people who agreed that refugees should be more evenly distributed within the EU (Eurobarometer 2015).

Not all articles argued for a supranational governance *per se* but for deeper harmonisation of common policies, which effectively is EU-level governance. For example, Angeloni & Spano (2018, 481) note that a prerequisite for a functioning method requires ‘deeper harmonizing of procedures and standards across countries’. The requirement of harmonization is linked to the difference in country-specific push and pull factors. In some Member States asylum claims are processed 5 times faster than in others, the right to work whilst waiting for a decision also varies between Member States. In addition, the quality of the reception conditions is not homogenous between Member States. These are all qualities of unharmonized policies, which lead to differentiated asylum flows between Member States. (Angeloni & Spano 2018, 479–481.) Fullerton (2016, 132), van Selm (2016, 60) and Brenke (2016, 522) support policy harmonization and argue that asylum law should be applied uniformly to ensure a common response.

To be able to maintain an equal and fair sharing of the burden, one Member State should not be perceived as more or less attractive than others, because it only increases secondary movement to the preferred Member States, effectively nulling the effects of a relocation or burden-sharing mechanism. Dustmann et al. (2017, 532) also argue that cost-savings of hosting asylum seekers could be found through cooperation between countries, especially when it comes to integrating refugees into the host community. Thus, policy harmonization is a crucial prerequisite. On the other hand, too much harmonization can come at the cost of effective national policies. Tinker (2016, 411–412) notes that Member States should be given the right to organize job training, culture and language classes in whichever way they find most suitable. Kucuk (2016, 469) as well suggests that the system should be developed into a centralized scheme, where all applications jointly processed. Finding a solution or agreeing on supranational governance seems to be more difficult by the day, and Havlova and Tamchynova (2016, 101) call for innovative measures to ingrate all Member States into the decision-making process, taking into account the national polarization of politics and divisions in opinions.

Morsut and Kruke (2017, 156) take a more subtle approach and conclude that there is a need for common governance, but in order to reach a conclusion on it, the efforts should be focused on crisis characterization and common measures that would be activated when a crisis hits. This gives Member States the right to organize policies nationally in most cases but mandate them to follow supranational agreements (EU-level) in cases of crisis. Morsut and Kruke (2017, 157) suggest that the crisis characterization is agreed upon on an intergovernmental level and the measures are taken by supranational institutions, such as the European Commission for example.

A crisis-activated supranational approach was also suggested by Fisseha (2017, 52), who suggested that the current refugee crisis is an international responsibility and thus

should be governed from a global level. Fisseha (2017, 52) suggests that the appropriate governing body could be a collaboration between states, international organisations and NGOs. This is to ensure a holistic approach to the problem (Fisseha 2017). Tudor (2015, 72) supports the idea of involving global players and suggests that the UNHCR could act as an auditor, and check all applications rejected by Member States to ensure international procedure compliance. Involving global-scale players into the governing body is a logical idea but faces heavy criticism as international bodies have minimal power over the Member States or even the European Union as a whole. Accountability and compliance is hard to enforce if needed. Some support for the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive was also found (Ineli-Ciger 2016). Since the Directive would require a political agreement to be activated, is it not necessarily seen as a viable option. On the other hand, Panobianco and Fontana (2018, 13) conclude that temporary protection might just be the golden path to which all Member States can politically agree.

Supranational governance was not always proposed for the asylum policies alone. Governance could be focused on common external partnerships and common external border control. A common approach to partnerships with third countries regarding asylum and migration procedures is enshrined in the Treaty of the Functioning EU Art. 79(3), which states that the EU should manage its asylum and migration flows in cooperation with third countries. Engaging in partnerships with third countries is an efficient way of addressing the problem before it creates problems inside EU borders. For example, the EU-Turkey deal can be seen as such an agreement. The effectiveness of these agreements is limited within the EU due to free movement inside the Schengen area whilst some countries still seem more attractive to asylum seekers. It is even argued that the external policies for migration are only in place because free movement inside the Schengen area requires external borders to be effectively protected with common regulation. On the other hand, the EU does not have any further legal powers to engage in external activities and is bound by budgetary and institutional constraints when it comes to new external policies. (Emiliani 2017, 23–27.)

External actions with third countries could also be used in an economic way to improve the economic situation of refugees and asylum seekers. Bin Talal (2016, 79) argues that bilateral agreements could be useful: for example, trade and manufacturing agreements to help refugees in the country of origin to manufacture and export to the EU via bilateral agreements. This would then decrease the need to make the journey to the EU, especially for those asylum seekers who are later identified as economic immigrants.

As the study conducted by Perusel (2015, 133) demonstrated, the asylum and refugee policies and interpretation of EU policies is on ‘a fragile trend towards’ more harmonization, further efforts are still needed to form a base for a working system. The research analysis showed that supranational governance is strongly supported, and it is a common

denominator for all suggested systems. The problem seems to lie in how to implement supranational governance, whether it be on a global, EU level or bilateral.

7.3 Burden-sharing

Another subcategory of prerequisites which emerged from the data was prerequisites for distributing and sharing the burden. It was obvious from the outset that burden-sharing would emerge as one of the prerequisites since this study is focused on burden-sharing mechanisms. As previously discussed, the concept of burden is not homogenous and is understood and calculated differently. From the content analysis, it can be concluded that a prerequisite for a working burden-sharing method is that the burden is shared.

Angeloni and Spano (2018, 478) suggest that a burden-sharing mechanism could only ever work if it was mandatory. This is because voluntary approaches offer Member States the possibility and temptation to deviate from commonly agreed policies. Member States are particularly tempted to use their inherent push and pull factors to regulate their flows of asylum seekers. Member States with more attractive asylum procedures have revised their migration legislation and border control policies, as in the case of Belgium, Denmark, France and Sweden. (Angeloni & Spano 2018, 477–479.) Mandatory schemes of burden-sharing would not permit Member States to differentiate their procedures and legislation. It seems that voluntary measures permit too much national differentiation and thus slow down and hinder burden-sharing initiatives.

Jones and Teytelboym (2016, 81) address the issue of the wealth of the ‘burden’ and conclude that a working system requires the EU to accept ‘enormous flows of refugees’ to resolve the current situation. Bin Talal (2016, 78) argues that the EU’s resources as a whole are more than enough to host the people fleeing from the Middle East, but it requires the Member States to share the responsibility of hosting refugees. Currently, the distribution of refugees between Member States is still very uneven (Roberts et al. 2016, 3). According to Bauböck (2018, 141), the sharing of the burden should be done in a manner that aims to maximize the number of refugees who receive protection.

In addition, several articles (see for example Perusel 2015; van Selm 2016; Fullerton 2016) noted that a prerequisite for sharing the burden is policy harmonization or enforced supranational governance. The Dublin system, for example, was built as a method of sharing the burden but it will never fulfil its duty if there is a lack of solidarity and policies differ within Member States (Perusel 2015, 134; van Selm 2016, 60). Nancheva (2015, 451) concurs and adds that the CEAS has been the primary obstruction to addressing the pressures in countries such as Greece and Italy.

The analysis of the articles shows that there is a need for burden sharing. The current situation does not seem to satisfy anyone. The Eurobarometer, at the peak of the crisis in

2015, supports this claim, as 73.3 percent of all those who participated in the questionnaire felt that the burden must be shared more equally within the EU (Eurobarometer 2015).

7.4 Long-term and external plans

Most articles clearly focused on the above-mentioned prerequisites, but some other prerequisites emerged from the content analysis. Long-term plans were advocated because the current situation was seen as a complex and not necessarily a one-off (Zodian 2015, 302). Roberts et al. (2016, 2) took a more hands-on approach and noted that practicalities such as language barriers, trust issues and cultural differences should be taken into account if a new method is to work.

As already mentioned in the preceding sections, the restlessness and crisis in the Middle East has been seen as a major contributor to the issue. Some saw it as too big of a problem to only address from within the EU and thus a prerequisite for a new mechanism should be that the reasons for migration should be addressed in the countries of origin. The EU should through its external actions be involved in ensuring peace, political stabilization and economic development in the countries of origin. (Roberts et al. 2016 ,4; Tudor 2015, 66).

External actions should be focused on alleviating the push factors for migration and the EU should focus on the root causes of migration, rather than negotiating bilateral agreements with third countries on returns and migration control. Strong cooperation and involvement of third countries is supported as the EU cannot act alone in the Middle East and Africa. A long-term plan should be focused on the root causes of displacement as well as address the crisis situation of the moment. (Population & Development Review 2016, 582–583.) After a thorough analysis of the reasons for addressing the issue as well as the prerequisites for a working system, the next chapters will focus on the analysis of the different suggested methods for a burden-sharing system.

8 ALTERNATIVE BURDEN-SHARING MECHANISMS

8.1 Alternative one-dimensional solutions

As previously described, one-dimensional mechanisms are mechanisms which take into account only one dimension, for example the number of refugees. One-dimensional hard mechanisms can be for example, binding rules or distributive quotas while one-dimensional soft mechanism can be pledging systems or temporary protection. The content analysis showed that one-dimensional mechanisms are a possible solution to the issue.

8.1.1 *Discourse shift*

The results showed that the problem is more widely researched than basic burden-sharing mechanisms give reason to believe. Some mechanisms focused on the problem of the refugee crisis paradigm. Del Re (2017, 160) notes that the issue should be primarily addressed through a paradigm shift from a problem-oriented scope to an opportunities-oriented scope. This means asylum seekers and migration in general would be understood in a larger context. The migration issue should be seen as an opportunity to address the ageing populations of Europe and other demographic shortcomings. Asylum seeking should be seen as one form of migration and migrants should be evaluated individually and, contrary to the current understanding, could have more than one motive for migrating to Europe. For example, a person could be an asylum seeker as well as an economic migrant. (Del Re 2017, 159–163.)

The general shift of the paradigm would be aided by multilateral arrangements with countries of origin and countries of transit. The study also suggests that ‘circulation migration’ should be taken into account fundamentally in the new system. Circulation migration is the idea that migrants, be they asylum seekers or other migrants, often have the general aspiration to emigrate back to their country of origin. In addition, many send remittances to their country of origin, thus contributing to the country of origin’s economy rather than the host countries. (Del Re 2017, 159–163.)

Shifting the paradigm and the conversation from problem-orientated to opportunity-orientated might be crucial in the long run, but the paradigm shift method fails to address the current issue of burden-sharing. What should be done in cases where the asylum seekers do not fit into any of the Member States demographic shortcomings? Elderly people could generally be thought to mainly generate costs to the host countries as they do not participate actively in the labour market. These kinds of asylum seekers are not addressed

in the paradigm shift model and it lacks a comprehensive perspective on the overall issue as well as practical advice for policy makers.

The shift in the focus of the discourse was supported in multiple articles. For example, El-Enany (2015, 37–38) notes that the current discourse contributes and supports the current restrictive migration regimes of the EU. Alternatives to border control cannot be discussed when the discourse revolves around protectionism. The issue should be seen from a broader historical perspective, which shows that movement of people has been a historical norm since the beginning of mankind (El-Enany 2015, 37–38). This can be seen as a quest to find alternative non-restrictive methods to solve the issue. Stavropoulou (2016, 9) and Hatton (2017) recognize the restrictions in the current discourse as well. Refugee-hosting is a public good and thus should not be approached through restriction (Hatton 2017). Verme (2016) brings up the lack of research, especially in economics, on the subject. Studies on the economics of forced migration can improve the targeting of programmes and theoretically test alternative policies (Verme 2016, 160-161). It is even argued that economic theory proves that limitless cross-border migration is a requirement for maximising global GDP, as it works in a similar way to free trade by maximising overall wealth (Straubhaar 2015, 238).

8.1.2 *Redistributive quotas*

One suggested one-dimensional method was to build a working hypothesis around an annual quota for refugees in Europe. This means calculating how many refugees of all the existing refugees Europe can host as a whole. This number would then be used as a planning tool to organize reception and processing capacities in Europe to match the global quota of refugees. (Stavropoulou 2016, 8.) Stavropoulou (2016, 8) already noted that a quota can only be used as an indicative tool, since actual refugee quotas are not allowed under international law. Redistributive quotas are a hard, one-dimensional mechanisms, but this could also be considered as a soft, one-dimensional mechanism, as there are no enforced obligations for Member States to comply to an indicative Europe-wide refugee quota.

Another way redistributive quotas can be used is through resettlement and relocation schemes. These can redistribute refugees from camps in countries of first entry (such as Turkey and Lebanon) or from one Member State to another. Redistribution from areas closer to the origin of refugees, such as Turkey and Lebanon, are initiatives to try and clamp down on the human smuggling market and to guarantee a legal way to the EU. On the other hand, redistributing refugees from one Member State to another is a burden-sharing mechanism which directly moves a part of the burden from one Member State to another. If the redistribution in either case is mandatory, it can be categorized as a one-

dimensional hard mechanism. If, on the other hand, it is not based on imperatives, it can be seen as a one-dimensional soft mechanism. The hypothetical, indicative European refugee quota suggested by Stavropoulou (2016, 9) could be introduced into the dialogue to ease the process of agreeing on a mandatory resettlement scheme, which could be based on the indicative ‘refugee quota’.

Redistributive and resettlement quotas were a trend in the articles analysed. Imperative distribution can be carried out in different ways. Jones and Teytelboym (2016, 80) propose that the redistribution be constructed in a matching model. This way both the hosting county and the refugee can express their opinion. This matching system could take into account the total amount of refugees, the preferences expressed by the Member States and the preferences of the refugee. The preferences of the hosting Member States could be linked to skills gaps, cultural issues such as language or religion, or population composition. (Jones & Teytelboym 2016, 80.) European demographic problems were mentioned more than once, and the refugee crisis was seen as a possible way to address the issue (see for example Zodian 2015, Brenke 2015, Hansen & Randeria 2018) This in turn would incentivize hosting countries to receive more refugees. Hansen and Randeria (2018, 995) note that even though Europe desperately needs migration, the current political situation does allow for sufficient migration or refugees. Nicolaescu and Petre (2017, 561) argue that the relocation areas should be carefully analysed to ensure refugees are not socially excluded, as it often leads to security issues in the host community, as mentioned earlier in this paper.

In addition, a matching system does not take into account the theoretically possible (EU population subtracted from the world population) vast number of refugees. Even if the number of refugees is not close to this, it can almost double the population of the EU and, as previously mentioned, it can be debated whether the EU is capable of hosting vast numbers of refugees. In theory, this could be combined with the above-mentioned theoretical European refugee quota to set a ceiling to the number of refugees. Hansen and Randeira (2018, 995) do not mention a European quota but estimate that Europe could accept between 25 and 50 percent of the world’s refugees. Kugiel (2016, 56–58) is the only one to stress the importance of forced returns in case of crisis as a solution to limiting the number of people who enter the EU.

8.1.3 *Military aid and border control*

Restrictive mechanisms can also be seen as a one-dimensional hard mechanism since they address one dimension, in this case again the number of refugees. Restrictive measures try to reduce the number of refugees that need to be hosted in the EU. Restriction can be put in place at different stages of the process in different ways. Border control can be seen

as a restrictive measure, since it is often aimed at restricting the entry of asylum seekers into the EU. Other suggested ways of restricting the entry of asylum seekers into the EU are assisting Turkey in hosting the current asylum seekers and refugees to discourage further movement, training for EU border countries in security-screen admitted people and to support Mediterranean efforts in limiting the number of crossings across the sea. (Metzel & Lorenzen 2017, 61–63).

These restrictive methods are reasoned by potential security threats, the smuggling market and the EU's capacity to host refugees. Metzel and Lorenzen (2017, 51–52) base their proposals for military intervention in Turkey, Greece and the Mediterranean on the understanding that they are methods which have worked before. They do so by referencing the Bosnian (1992–95) and Kosovo (1999) crises, which both involved military intervention in the end. No other articles showed support for military interventions even though critical views of the EU's capacity were expressed. On the other hand, as previously discussed in the prerequisites chapter, some consider the EU to be more than capable of handling the number of refugees currently seeking refuge. The closest supporting arguments for military interventions were arguments for enforced border control and externalization of the problem (see Tudor 2015, 74; Stavropoulou 2016, 7; Hatton 2017, 474–475).

8.1.4 *Financial methods*

Whilst one-dimensional mechanisms are often seen as mechanisms that assign a number of refugees to Member States and do not partake in initiatives of exchange of financial aid or other aspects, Angeloni and Spano (2018, 483) note that a study conducted by Millbank in 2001 has produced results in stemming migration flows by improving conditions in the source regions. This is seen in popular terms as the 'throw money at the problem' solution, and although some results have been achieved, one can note from the 2015 crisis that some crises are too unpredictable to be addressed beforehand from the outside.

Though this one-dimensional aid-based mechanism has not been the current solution to the problem, it has been a part of the actions the EU has taken. The EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016 can be seen as such an agreement. Effectively, the deal between the EU and Turkey is such that the EU provides Turkey with funds to host Syrian refugees if Turkey does not act as a transit country and forward them to the EU. The EU is also allowed to send back asylum seekers whose claim has been declared inadmissible from the Greek islands to Turkey, requiring that the EU Member States host one additional Syrian refugee for each migrant returned to Turkey. Basically, Turkey is acting as a plug, and the question remains whether this a long-term solution to the problem, and for how

long is Turkey likely to participate in this deal. For example, Angeloni and Spano (2018, 482) critique this deal for its questionable outlook on human rights.

Another financial suggestion was made by Stavropoulou (2016, 9), who suggested that if decisions are made on a supranational level, the financing of those policies should also come from a supranational institution. This would mean that the financing for hosting refugees should come from the EU, and Stavropoulou (2016, 9) argues for a ‘fair distribution of financial and human resources’. As an idea this is logical, but Stavropoulou does not address the issue of how to calculate the costs of hosting a refugee, for example. Neither is the likelihood of striking political agreement discussed. Surprisingly, none of the other articles supported or brought up the same idea (sharing budgets), even though the Dublin IV regulation entails sharing of human resources of EU institutions, such as Frontex and EASO. Collett (2016, 41) calls for an assessment of the needs of the hosting countries rather than the accessibility of funds, indicating that the current funds could be used in a more efficient manner.

8.2 Alternative soft multi-dimensional solutions

8.2.1 *Involving the private sector*

Different mechanisms for implicit trade emerged from the content analysis. These all had in common the view that the needs of the host country should be taken into account. For example, Costello (2016, 14) argues that private a sponsorship programme could increase the number of refugees hosted in the EU. A private sponsorship programme, in which individuals and locals are matched to a refugee for integration, can be seen as implicit trade since the host countries can decide to commit to help solve the issue by sponsoring a refugee. Costello (2016, 14) suggests that private sponsorship is accompanied by issuing humanitarian visas for those whose ‘protection needs cannot be met in the region of origin’.

Involving the private sector in the discussion was suggested by others as well. Roberts et al. (2016, 3) note that whilst it can be mutually beneficial to involve the private sector and the labour market, one must make sure that even though the demand for cheap labour in Europe is booming, the rights of all workers must be respected. Bin Talal (2016, 79) notes that refugees could also find manufacturing jobs in countries of first entry outside the EU, if exporting to the EU was made easier, thus increasing production opportunities in such countries. This is a way for the private sector to implicitly participate in ameliorating the crisis.

Collett (2016, 42) does not mention the private sector by name but calls for deeper collaboration between the countries of origin, host countries and international organisations. Bin Talal (2016, 79–80) also suggests that some of the EU funding spent on hard border control could be spent on investments in the countries of origin and, in addition, the EU could allow trade with the host country more freely and grant tax exemptions to incentivize trade. Involving the private sector and diminishing trade barriers between the EU and hosting countries could also be an answer to the previously discussed restrictive discourse issue. Instead of enforcing restrictive methods, trade between the continent alleviates the need to migrate to the EU. Menendez (2016, 414) notes that hosting asylum seekers and refugees in the EU could create positive stimuli to boost the economies hosting refugees in the short run. In the mid-term perspective, refugees are expected to be self-supportive and contribute by paying taxes. In the long term, refugees could be beneficial and even crucial in upholding the current pension systems in the EU. (Menendez 2016, 414.)

8.2.2 *Proactive measures*

Soft multi-dimensional mechanisms can also be proactive and address issues before they arise. Tudor (2015, 66–67) claims the solution to the problem is to fund the World Food Programme, which distributes food aid in countries of first entry, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Hatton (2017, 479) gives support to this idea by concluding that the first step to address the issue is to improve the conditions of those who are in refugee camps. Tudor (2015, 66–67) and Hatton (2017, 479) both agree that the next step is to set up a resettlement scheme, but rather than opting for an EU asylum policy, they both support international refugee recognition at the or close to the region of origin in order to prevent hazardous trips to the EU and to provide refuge for those in the most vulnerable state.

Proactive measures suggested in the articles were often those aimed at resolving the crisis in the area of origin. For example, Dustmann et al. (2017, 535) concludes that ‘to prevent refugee movements in the future’ the EU should aim at avoiding conflict and instability in the Middle East. Whether this is actually a proactive measure can be contested, as it is directly a reactive measure to the current crisis. However, Dustmann et al. (2017) do also propose the idea of using foreign policy as a proactive method to prevent future crises from happening, which can be seen as a proactive method. The proactive measures suggested in the articles seemed to be closely linked to the externalization of the problem, meaning committing to actions outside the EU. Externalization proposals also seemed to be related to a smaller share of the burden. For example, as was discussed

earlier, the United Kingdom hosts a small number of refugees when compared to its comparative size, economic strength or population. At the same time, the United Kingdom is the single largest contributor in terms of humanitarian aid to bordering countries of the Syrian refugee crisis (Roberts et al. 2016, 3). Meanwhile, the EU is criticized for making humanitarian aid contingent on migration controls in the countries receiving aid (Hansen & Randeira 2018, 995).

Humanitarian aid is also criticised as being merely a means of postponing the issue rather than being a part of the solution. The needs of the refugees and asylum seekers to sustain livelihood are more developmental than humanitarian. These needs are, for example, access to land and employment opportunities. Addressing development issues in the countries of origin and first entry are argued to be the most effective ways to limit further migration. (Cordova 2016, 8-9.)

8.3 Alternative hard multi-dimensional mechanisms

The content analysis showed that multi-dimensional mechanisms were strongly supported. In addition, the largest number of multi-dimensional suggestions were related to multi-dimensional hard mechanisms. As discussed earlier, multi-dimensional hard mechanisms are mechanisms which take into account several aspects and are mandatory by nature. For example, explicit compensation is considered a multi-dimensional hard mechanism, as everyone has to participate but they can choose the way in which they participate, for example by the number of refugees hosted vs. funds contributed to the issue. The content analysis showed that most suggested multi-dimensional hard mechanisms were based around compensation models.

8.3.1 *Italy as a hotspot*

The multi-dimensional mechanism proposed in the study by Angeloni and Spano (2018) is to create a hotspot area within the EU and centralize decision-making and redistribution in the EU to create a more effective and fair system. Angeloni and Spano (2018) suggest that Italy should take a leading role in the centralization of decision-making and redistribution as well as the initial reception of asylum seekers. The reason why one Member State has been chosen to act as an intermediary instead of an EU agency is because Angeloni and Spano (2018) believe that it is easier to reach political consensus this way.

Italy has been chosen based on a model of game theory. According to the current Dublin Regulation, the country of first entry is responsible for processing the asylum claim. This has burdened Italy tremendously in the past years, and changing the current system

is in the interest of Italy. By contrast, currently few other Member States see the revision of the Dublin Regulation as necessary, because most probably it would just lead to a bigger share of the burden. Italy thus has an incentive to foster a working burden-sharing mechanism within the EU. Italy is also a good candidate for the hotspot country due to its formal and informal diplomatic ties with north African countries. Italy is experienced in dealing with crisis situations and is capable of boasting a large network of humanitarian organisations, which can work together in rescue missions and emergency health services. (Angeloni & Spano 2018, 487–489.) In addition, Angeloni & Spano (2018, 489) suggest that immigration could be part of the solution to Italy's aging population, low fertility rates and diminishing general population.

In the proposal, Italy would act as a reception hotspot, where all asylum claims would be processed and initial reception handled. After the claims have been processed, a pre-agreed number of asylum seekers would be relocated to other Member States. This would relieve all other Member States from administrative and initial hosting costs. A preliminary study conducted by Di Pasquale et al. (2016) estimates that the total annual cost of receiving the asylum seekers, processing their claims and hosting them for an initial six-month period would be 2.165 billion euros. This sum has been reached using an estimate of 200,000 asylum seekers per annum. The same study estimates that over 25,000 people would be employed full-time through these ventures in Italy. (Angeloni & Spano 2018, 481–482.)

Centralising asylum claim procedures to one unified asylum procedure would guarantee a fair evaluation of claims for the asylum seekers as well. It would also abolish the desire to apply for asylum in a different Member State because of perceived more lenient approval. This would also inherently discourage the need for smugglers and human trafficking, since decision-making would be centralized and people would not benefit from trafficking between Member States. (Angeloni & Spano 2018.)

As with other proposed mechanisms, the Italian proposal also allows asylum seekers to express their preferred location. This has been taken into account in the system because it makes secondary movement less desirable and accelerates the process of integration in the host country. Another similarity is that the mechanism allows host countries to present their interests as well. The Italian proposal goes further than other mechanisms and suggests that host countries can specify their interests in the desired skills the asylum seekers should have after the six-month initial hosting period to integrate the refugees in the host countries' labour market most efficiently. (Angeloni & Spano 2018.)

Obvious positive aspects in the Italian proposal lay in the inherent savings that could be achieved through the centralization of the system. In addition, savings could be made within the EASO and Frontex personnel, as they would mainly be stationed in Italy. Angeloni & Spano (2018, 488) also note that the centralized system would lessen the amount

of irregular and unlawful migration, decreasing the national need for border control systems and defensive measures. Preliminary estimates show that no ‘fresh money’ would be needed to implement the Italian proposal, as redirecting current funds would be sufficient. (Angeloni & Spano 2018.)

The Italian proposal offers a multi-dimensional hard mechanism, which takes into account the preferences of host countries and asylum seekers as well as aspects of the current problem. The explicit compensation is that other Member States finance Italy via the EU budget. A fatal flaw in the proposal is that it lacks suggestions as to how refugees should be distributed among Member States and confines itself to stating that it should be a pre-agreed number. In addition, the system lacks political approval at the EU level as well as at the Italian level. The fatal flaw of not addressing the distribution of refugees makes the system as such a suboptimal one, because the core issue is not addressed. Building a hotspot within the EU was a completely unique idea proposed by Angeloni and Spano (2018). Most articles argue, instead, that refugee recognition should be externalized and handled outside EU borders (see for example Hatton 2017; Dustmann et al. 2017).

Dustmann et al. (2017, 534) argue that a coordinated refugee system needs centralized decision making outside the EU, meaning that asylum claims should be decided upon when the person in question is still in the country of origin or in a country of first entry. This kind of externalized handling of claims could ensure more coherent results and act as a base for a resettlement mechanism. Dustmann et al. (2017, 534.) Leonard and Kaunert (2016, 50) criticize external ‘transit centres’ for their questionable outlook on human rights issues, procedural and practical challenges. For example, whether handling asylum claims outside the EU would be any savings is contested (Leonard & Kaunert 2016, 50).

8.3.2 External actions

Emiliani (2017) goes further than Italy, completely outside the EU. The research proposes that the refugees and even migration in general be dealt with external actions managed by the EU. This would mainly focus on partnerships and agreements with third countries, made by the European Commission on behalf of the Member States. A full-fledged goal is to establish EU migration diplomacy that would act as a tool to handle migration to the EU. Niemann and Zaun (2018, 8–9) support the idea of external actions as a part of the solution. The EU-Turkey Statement could act as a leading example for similar Statements with Afghanistan and Mali, for example. However, at the same time the EU-Turkey Statement is being criticized for its small impact in relative terms (Niemann & Zaun 2018, 8–

9). Emiliani (2017, 25) notes that an external actions system could be developed by adding dimensions which take into account the Member States need for special labour or ageing population. These issues could be addressed through external migration management.

External actions are argued to be the most efficient way to tackle the problem, since the EU is already committing to mitigating the root causes of migration in countries of origin. It is also in the interest of the Union to have reliable partnerships with third countries to keep partners accountable in order to maintain good relationships. External actions are also deeply rooted in the history of Member States. Many Member States, for example Italy and France, have bilateral agreements with third countries. It is also considered to be a politically more viable solution, as it does not impose on the sovereignty of Member States in a way that a system which requires common governance does. (Emiliani 2017, 25–28.)

Tougher border control is also considered an external action to control migration and asylum seeking. Strengthening border control shifts the responsibility of lodging asylum claims to third countries outside the EU. Current conduct has proved that there is a general will to abide by EU directives and regulations in a stricter manner than before the crisis, because the impacts are immediate in Member States. Member States have been more willing to cooperate in border control issues because it shifts the burden outside the EU, and thus no Member State is worse off participating in integration, as would be the case for redistributive quotas. (Niemann & Zaun 2018, 14–15.)

On the other hand, external actions do not offer a clear-cut solution to the vast amounts of refugees. The number of claims is dependent on the situation in the sending countries and cannot be controlled by the EU. In addition, the admittance and reception of refugees is conducted on a voluntary basis in the EU-Turkey deal, for example, and the deal has shown that the EU is unable to keep its end of the agreement based on voluntariness (Emiliani 2017, 24). The lack of viability in upholding potential future agreements is a crucial failing in the method. Menendez (2016, 414) critiques external agreements with third countries as being unsustainable, unfair and unstable solutions for the issue. Kugiel (2016, 57) sees them as sometimes being a way to ‘veil unwillingness to take part in solving the problem’. Though policy-wise the external actions method would be ideal to implement and would only require a limited amount of additional legal power for the Commission, the system cannot allocate and handle the amounts of refugees and asylum claims received during peak years.

8.3.3 Tradable Refugee-Admission Quotas

Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 3–6) devised their own multilateral system, known as the Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas (TRAQ). This model takes into account the country-specific costs of accommodating a refugee or an asylum seeker, the maximization of cost-effectiveness, the preferences of refugees and asylum seekers and the host country's preference type of displaced person. (Moraga and Rapoport 2015, 3–6).

Moraga's and Rapoport's (2015, 3–6) system is based on two basic assumptions: (1) granting refuge to acknowledged refugees is considered a basic human right and an international public good (as Hatton 2017 argued) and (2) providing refuge and protection to refugees and asylum seekers generates costs for the host country, which can be seen as a 'burden'. The system is market-based, where countries are assigned an initial quota of refugees, which they can then trade with other participating countries. The system seeks to find and always ends with an optimal solution, where the marginal net cost of hosting one additional refugee or asylum seeker equals to that of another country (excluding zero as an option), as illustrated in Figure 8. They argue that this type of mechanism would be most cost-efficient because refugees and asylum seekers would be hosted in countries where it is most economical. (Moraga & Rapoport, 2014, 650.)




Figure 8 Example of an equilibrium where the marginal net cost of one additional asylum seeker or refugee equals that of another country (Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 652).

Figure 8 illustrates an example market with two participants. Market equilibrium is achieved at a point where the marginal net costs equal each other. The marginal net cost curves of each country are shown on the vertical axis and the point where the quantities of refugees hosted (m_{NZ} and m_A) cross paths is the market optimum. This means that in

this equilibrium, country A is willing to receive more asylum seekers and refugees and get paid for doing so by country NZ, who, in turn, is willing to pay for not receiving the initial quota amount assigned to it. (Moraga & Rapoport 2014, 652.)

Moraga and Rapoport (2015) argue that their system could be used to solve the Syrian refugee crisis and should be limited to an EU Member State market only. They demonstrate that the number of initial quotas assigned does not affect the competence of the system “as long as the market is competitive”. On a technical level, the competitiveness of the market would be ensured by a computerized continuous double auction mechanism. From the point of view of policy, the market can be made rational and more effective by carefully deliberated distribution of initial quotas. Moraga and Rapoport suggest (2014, 652) that Member States which would benefit the most from trading their quotas to money would be allocated a higher initial quota. This would ensure that it is always more rational to participate in the market rather than stay out of it. Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 5) refer to Thielemann et al. (2010) who argue that financial compensation is one of the most preferred solidarity mechanisms by Member States.

Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 3–4) refer to Wagner and Kraler (2014), who have studied different quota systems suggested or implemented by Member States throughout history. They compare seven different quota distribution systems, of which four are largely based on economic strength and population, two criteria which are often highly correlated. The three other quota distribution methods take into account other factors, such as mean asylum application amount, share of EU GDP and number of applicant and admitted asylum seekers in the past three years. As Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 4) point out, the different distribution quota systems yield rather similar results, with more economically developed Member States being assigned the largest quotas.

Moraga and Rapoport (2015, 5) include in their Tradable Refugee-Admission Quota (TRAQ) system a very similar matching system to that suggested by Jones and Teytelboym (2016, 80). The matching system could be built to take into consideration the preferences of the refugees and the host countries. Moraga and Rapoport (2015) do not go as far as others previously mentioned, who suggest that cultural preferences such as religion and language should be taken into account, but the system is built to maintain several indicators and if needed, so cultural preferences could also technically be added.

Generally, the content analysis showed that even though multi-dimensional mechanisms were not as prominent as simpler one-dimensional mechanisms, there was great interest in the TRAQ system. Altogether eight articles, in addition to Moraga’s and Rapoport’s own, referenced the TRAQ system. This accounts for 14 percent of the articles analysed. The percentage can be seen as relatively high since the TRAQ is a specific model of a specific subcategory. The TRAQ model has undeniably been noted in the academic field. In addition, Mitchell (2017, 323) gives support to a lottery or bidding system, which the TRAQ system can be seen as, when relocating refugees.

Dustmann et al. (2017, 532–533) gave support to the TRAQ model and additionally suggested that attention should be paid to where to relocate refugees within Member States. Dustmann et al. (2017, 533) advocate relocating refugees where the costs of hosting are lowest and integration chances highest. These tend to be areas where other refugees already reside, providing a support network. On the other hand, the political costs of relocation must also be taken into account. Even though, in financial terms, hosting refugees in urban areas is often more expensive, the political costs of hosting refugees in rural areas might trump the financial costs of hosting them in urban areas. (Dustmann et al. 2017, 531–533.)

Bauböck (2018, 141–142) commends the TRAQ model for offering an alternative method of contributing. The choice between hosting refugees and contributing financially to help other Member States host refugees might be politically the difference between a deal and no deal. Niemann and Zaun (2018, 16) concur that the TRAQ is a valid contender as it offers countries refusing to host refugees the opportunity to contribute. Hatton (2017, 485–486) suggests that the TRAQ model might be able to encourage Member States to participate in a resettlement programme if they were made a stakeholder, i.e. have a preference, but reaching an agreement with more than a million spontaneous asylum application a year seems unlikely.

Thielemann (2018, 78) also gives credit to the TRAQ model for its built-in efficiency but deems it difficult to avoid the political backlash of being reframed as ‘treating refugees as commodities’. Even though Thielemann (2018, 78) recognizes the problem, he sees that more imperative and binding methods are necessary to ‘strengthen compliance’. Improved monitoring, binding rules and less discretion are the means needed to overcome collective action dilemmas according to public goods literature (Thielemann 2018, 78). Thielemann (2018, 79) argues for multi-dimensional mechanisms, as they can prevent political deadlock and be more efficient. But unlike Niemann and Zaun (2018, 16), who credit the system for allowing that Member States refuse to host refugees to contribute in a different manner, Thielemann (2018, 79) calls for the restriction of financial compensation and no Member State should be able to ‘buy themselves out’ and should contribute at least in some way in a resettlement initiative.

The TRAQ system takes into account multiple dimensions and it can be considered a multi-dimensional hard mechanism. This means that the ‘burden’ is shared in an ampler way throughout the Member States. On the other hand, the TRAQ system is based on quotas, which are an imperative form of regulations. The system is similar to the Kyoto emission trading scheme but takes into account more comprehensively various dimensions of refugee and asylum seeker policies. The content analysis showed that imperative measures are strongly supported and both one- and multi-dimensional soft mechanisms failed to address key points of the issue, such as the sharing of the burden or distribution

of quotas. Both the one- and multi-dimensional hard mechanisms showed variety. However, it seems the articles build considerable support for quota-based systems, especially market-based quota systems, where both the asylum seekers and the host countries can present preferences.

9 CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Reflections on the research questions

The aim of this study was to gain a holistic understanding of the burden-sharing mechanisms available for addressing the post 2015 crisis era. To be able to reach a well-rounded understanding of the question, two sub-questions were posed. In addition to the main research question, this thesis studied the reasons why the issue needs to be addressed as well as the prerequisites proposed for mechanisms. The reasons for addressing the issue seem straightforward; the existing methods do not work in the current situation. All but one of the articles studied mentioned the 2015 crisis and most articles continued to reference the inadequacy of the current system as motivation to study alternative methods.

The expressed flaws in the current system were abundant. Most of the criticism related to the Dublin Regulation, because it fails offer ways to share the burden of asylum seekers and refugees between Member States. Based on the articles studied, it can be concluded that the main problem with the current system is that it does not provide solutions for how to share the burden of asylum seekers and refugees. Southern Member States are still inequitably burdened by the large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, while eastern European and some central European Member States are closing their borders. The critique on the current system was evident, and interestingly, the EU decision-making capabilities were also criticised. No solution can help if the EU is unable to find a way to agree on one. Sharing the burden also proved to be an important prerequisite for any new system. No articles contested the fact that the current distribution is inequitable.

Interestingly, even though almost all articles mentioned the 2015 crisis, the reasons for addressing the issue were not limited to the 2015 crisis and the flaws in the current system. Multiple articles made reference to megatrends, such as environmental and economic issues as well as demographic changes. In particular, the growing population of the African Continent was mentioned as a future trend. In addition, the expected environmental changes in African and Middle Eastern countries was noted. One clear observation is that the African and Middle Eastern countries will become increasingly more important to the EU. References to African and Middle Eastern countries were made in the articles when discussing prerequisites and mechanisms as well. Most external activities that were proposed in the articles, in particular, mainly involved countries in Africa and the Middle East.

Besides the crisis, the flaws in the current system and the megatrends, other reasons for addressing the issue were also proposed in the articles. These included security and integration questions as well as discourse issues. Interestingly, security issues, which are most prominently evident in the media, were only addressed twice in the mechanisms that

were proposed in the articles. Needless to say, the military aid model obviously addressed security issues. In addition, security questions were brought up in discourse that involved discussing why it is imperative to deliberate where to resettle refugees. Based on the articles analysed, it can be concluded that security issues do not appear to play a major role in addressing the issue.

The articles analysed clearly illustrated the need to explore the issue from angles other than those examined to date if a solution is to be found. It can be argued that the suggested change in discourse from problem-oriented to opportunity-oriented might be linked with the need to address megatrends, as megatrends could eventually make constant refugee flows of the current 'crisis' magnitude a new norm. Thus, addressing the issue through a lens of opportunities could quite possibly yield new solutions. In general, it can be said that the 2015 crisis and the flaws in the current system have been a major driver for research, but other underlying reasons for addressing the issue reveal that research is much needed and timely.

The prerequisite that was mostly commonly proposed was that of a supranational governance of some kind. However, many forms of governance can be deemed viable. Bilateral, EU-level and even global-level governance were all suggested, the EU-level being the most common suggestion. This is probably at least to some extent tied to the geographical limitations set in this thesis. Studies focused on the EU will often tend to suggest EU-level governance, as it is already a well-established common area. In this light, suggestions of bilateral or global governance are interesting because they are less obvious proposals. Bilateral governance looks to find efficiency in swift decision-making whilst global governance deemed justifiable due to the sheer scale of the problem. Just as the CEAS was criticized of its inability to implement and enforce accountability, the articles did not see an easy solution to the governance issues, as many articles noted that agreeing on supranational governance seems to be impossible at the moment. To ease the pressure, crisis-based supranational governance models were suggested because in most cases such models leave decision-making to the national governments.

Unlike supranational governance, where there was broad support for some level of governance, border control as a prerequisite, instead, was a more polarized prerequisite. Some strongly advocated enforced border control while others called for non-restrictive border control and granting humanitarian visas. The border control issue demonstrates that there is no one right solution to the refugee crisis, but instead, different models should be investigated and evaluated. Enforced border control was often a prerequisite for a hard mechanism while non-restrictive border control initiatives were generally linked to advocating for a change in the discourse or to opportunity-oriented mechanisms. Even though, based purely on frequency, border control was one of the most predominant prerequisites, the results demonstrated that no one given type of border control appears to be a general

requirement. On the other hand, any one given system can depend on a specific type of border control even though, by and large, it does not seem to be a constant.

The results demonstrated that the most commonly suggested one-dimensional mechanisms were the types of mechanisms that were already proposed as examples in the theory of international burden-sharing mechanisms from over decade ago. Most articles advocating one-dimensional mechanisms suggested different types of redistributive quotas. However, the theory offered voluntary pledging systems as an example of an international burden-sharing mechanism, but this model did not show up in the results. The results clearly supported hard, imperative one-dimensional mechanisms rather than soft mechanisms. The softness of the mechanisms was sometimes due to the limitations of international law, as was in the case for the suggested European refugee quota model. The results support one-dimensional mechanisms as a possible solution to the issue and they strongly advocate a hard, one-dimensional mechanism.

The results clearly showed that there is an academic interest in soft and hard multi-dimensional mechanisms as well. Catering to the opportunity-based scope, which is categorized as a soft mechanism, some articles supported involving the private sector. This could be done in the host country or in the country of origin by means of trade and tax exemptions. This also supports the non-restrictive approach, which was generally favoured by universities and businesses. Other soft, multi-dimensional methods discussed in the articles were proactive methods, which were largely based on financial support in third countries. The discussion on humanitarian aid, and the manner in which EU ties it with border control, was almost as polarized as the border control conversation. Humanitarian aid was seen as an easy political solution and as a way to evade the issue altogether. The results revealed there was more support for developmental aid, which addresses the economic, sociological, environmental and political issues too.

Multi-dimensional hard mechanisms were not suggested as frequently as one-dimensional hard mechanisms. However, multi-dimensional hard mechanisms seemed to address the issues that one-dimensional hard mechanisms failed to provide an answer to. Based on the results, the multi-dimensional hard mechanism that was supported the most was the TRAQ model. It is worth noting that support for the TRAQ system was significant, when taking into account the number of references and support offered to a single model. The TRAQ model incorporated the most popular one-dimensional hard mechanism, namely a redistributive quota, in the system. In addition, it was based on a market-based mechanism, which allows for Member States to choose the way they participate, thus finding agreement easier.

Even though the TRAQ model was the single most referenced model, it was also criticized to some extent for treating refugees as commodities. In addition, the method was criticized for essentially allowing richer Member States to 'buy themselves out' without

hosting any refugees. This shortfall could be resolved by setting a restriction on the number of quotas that can be traded. This way, Member States could only trade a limited number of their quotas. Setting a restriction would, however, reduce the likelihood of reaching an agreement on the system and should therefore be carefully evaluated.

Some interesting conclusions can be drawn from the results. One key conclusion is that the 2015 crisis has instigated a new surge of research on the topic, even though underlying reasonings are much more heterogenic. The only constant prerequisite for a functioning system seems to be supranational governance at some level. Based on the results, mechanisms of an imperative by nature were the ones that were supported the most. The results showed support for both one-dimensional and multi-dimensional mechanisms. The most frequently suggested mechanisms were redistributive quota systems. Market-based quota systems were also supported by the results, as they were perceived as potentially easier to implement. It is interesting to note that the EU proposals follow the suggestions of the academia, not by applying any given model, but by proposing more imperative actions, multi-dimensional models in which contributions can be ones that do not involve hosting refugees alone and a quota-based crisis mechanism. These are proposed in the Dublin IV Regulation currently being discussed in the Council. Based on the results, it can be concluded that the EU and the academia have both shifted towards hard mechanisms and, to ensure agreement, towards multi-dimensional mechanisms. The difference in the suggestions made by these academic articles is that the additional dimensions are based on efficiency, country-specific advantages and the ability to choose, while it seems the additional dimensions the EU suggests are a political tool to reach an agreement on a more imperative method.

9.2 Theoretical and practical implications and limitations to the study

The theoretical implications of this study are limited. This thesis does not offer any new theories; instead, it offers a holistic view of the subject in the field of academia. Collecting and analysing the views of the academia is the theoretical implication of this thesis. This thesis offers a general view of what has been suggested and what options are available, setting them into context with the existing theory.

On the other hand, the theoretical implications of this study can be very useful in practical terms. The results of this thesis offer an overview, which can be useful when deciding which methods should be further investigated and testing their feasibility in being implemented in practice.

This thesis has some evident strengths and weaknesses. The fact that it is solely focused on published academic articles on the topic limits the number of possible solutions

since other forums are not analyzed. On the other hand, studying only academically published studies ensures the suggested mechanisms are fairly well studied and can be regarded as somewhat viable solutions.

By analyzing the academic articles within the framework of the existing theory on international burden sharing, it can be concluded that the EU's actions seemed to follow political cues rather than academic suggestions. This proved that studying only academic solutions lacks institutional realism. Even though many of articles studied noted that reaching a conclusion on the EU level is hard, to say the least, they still essentially suggested only methods which required some level of supranational governance. This goes to show that, based on academic studies on the subject, national actions are not well equipped to address the issue. A common solution is called for, whether it be on an EU level or on a global level, or even just a bilateral one, and the results of this content analysis support the argument that cooperation is key.

This study was conducted with the aim of gaining a holistic view of the possible methods available. Thus, it does not analyse specific models in detail. This limits the theoretical and practical implications of the study, as it does not analyse or advocate any specific model. This means the results of this study as such cannot be transposed on practical level. Instead, the results give guidance on the direction in which suggestions are evolving and which alternatives should be further researched and investigated. This research gives indications of which models could possibly be first to be tested or modelled on a practical level.

9.3 Where the EU is at now

Although we can see EU regulation proposals moving towards a multi-dimensional hard mechanism, we can question whether is the EU moving at all, if no decisions can be agreed reached. The refugee issue has been on the agenda at high-level EU negotiations for quite some time already. The Council has mainly discussed the new proposed Dublin Regulation IV, which still remains unresolved. As previously noted, the proposed Dublin IV implements an imperative crisis-activated relocation scheme based on quotas calculated for each Member State according to the criteria described in chapter 3.1.4. This could be seen as a clear step towards multi-dimensional mechanisms.

On the other hand, it has been observed that future compromise suggestions of the Council could move towards enforced border control – a one-dimensional hard mechanism. This would be effected by enforcing internal and external border controls through EU instruments (Borsa 2018). Whether this is an easier solution for Member States to agree on remains to be seen. It seems as the current Commission is running out of political

steam. A new Commission will assume office in November 2019 following the EU elections in May 2019. The new Commission might possibly produce proposals for mechanisms that could perhaps satisfy all Member States. It is worth bearing in mind that while this thesis discusses the mechanisms at a theoretical level, the potential it offers at the practical level is strongly related to the decision-making climate of the EU. If it is not implemented, no mechanism can help ameliorate inequitable burden sharing.

9.4 Suggestions for further research

The research on this topic is still quite limited and further research could be conducted on various angles of the topic. This research indicates that especially the implementation of multi-dimensional mechanisms should be further investigated. These mechanisms could be modelled using economic models developed in the field of forced migration economics. Economics of forced migration could provide useful methods of estimating the effects of different models on the host country and the country of origin. It is important to understand the consequences of each mechanism before implementing any method at the EU level. Understanding and projecting the implementation of mechanisms could also further the incentives of reaching an agreement, because the mechanisms become more predictable.

This research clearly described the academic support for redistributive quotas. Their legality and implementation should be further studied. In addition, alternative redistribution keys should also be studied, as they offer different redistributive quotas for Member States. On the other hand, the articles analysed all seemed to conclude that the current distribution is unequal and suggested that distribution keys often allocated refugees in a similar manner, i.e. a larger quota for more economically established Member States. Individual quotas and the basis of the quota might still play a crucial role in the politics of reaching a decision. Hence, the redistribution key alternatives should be investigated even though current studies demonstrate that different distribution keys yield similar results.

In addition, this research supports further studies of the TRAQ model. The articles gave strong support to this particular method and its implementation possibilities should be further researched. The researchers of the TRAQ model have themselves conducted simulations of the model but further research should be conducted to validate and extend the understanding of the implementation of the TRAQ mechanism.

Moreover, the results of this content analysis demonstrated that the current situation might not be a ‘one-off’ but might instead give indication of what the future might hold. Analysing the issue from this perspective calls for proactive mechanisms as well. The effects of proactive methods should be further studied, as the articles showed that they are currently on a theoretical level and there are no hard figures, for example, for how

much granting tax exemptions to countries of first entry would encourage refugees to build a livelihood in those areas and thereby further reducing migration to the EU. The effects of trade-related methods should be further studied, as they could offer similar advantages to the development of the regions of origin as trade has offered to other parts of the world. History has shown that non-restrictive trade policies increase total wealth and the benefits of free trade commonly recognised by the field of economics. The fields of social science and cultural studies could also give valuable insight into how and where humanitarian or development aid would be most beneficial. By addressing developmental issues it becomes easier to address the root causes of migration, thereby decreasing the numbers of displaced persons. A proactive model should always be accompanied by a reactive model, such as the TRAQ system, to ensure that people in the most vulnerable position receive the protection they are guaranteed by international law.

10 SUMMARY

This thesis studied how burden-sharing should be addressed in the EU post 2015. The study was conducted by using a qualitative content analysis method. This method built on the existing theory of international burden-sharing methods and was supported by two sub-questions: why should the issue be addressed and what are the prerequisites for a functioning system. The study of these sub-questions was data-driven and the results generated four main categories for each sub-question. The data chosen for this study consisted of peer-reviewed academic articles published in 2015 or later.

The results demonstrated that the 2015 crisis has acted as a catalyst for research and has been the main motivator for instigating research within this topic. Other major motivations for research were the inadequacies of the current system, environmental and economic issues and demographic changes. The reasons for addressing the issue were close to uniform. By contrast, support for various prerequisites was far from uniform. The results illustrated that some level of supranational governance is called for. However, border control as a prerequisite is questionable, as some argued for enforced border control and some for non-restrictive border control. Border control does not seem to be a significant prerequisite for a functioning system, even though it can be instrumental for a given system to function.

The results of the content analysis showed that hard mechanisms are strongly advocated. There was significant support for one-dimensional redistributive quotas as well as multi-dimensional market-based mechanisms. The essential difference between these systems seems to lie in the likelihood of reaching political agreement, which according to the academic articles would be easier to find by using multi-dimensional mechanisms. On the other hand, when the mechanisms were compared with the current actions in the EU, we noted that the multi-dimensional Dublin IV has been at a standstill since it was proposed in 2016. This does not prove that one-dimensional mechanisms would be easier to reach agreement on but poses a challenge for the institutions as well as the Member States.

In conclusion, it can be said that the results of the content analysis follow the theory of international burden-sharing. Hence the theory seems to cover all possible alternatives. It can also be concluded that the EU's actions have been moving towards academically supported, multi-dimensional mechanisms. On the other hand, the current negotiation stalemate seems to be shifting the EU's perspective towards one-dimensional mechanisms, as initial information on current meetings would seem to indicate. The results of this thesis offer a holistic overview of the topic and different mechanisms proposed by academic literature. They can be used to assess which mechanisms should be further investigated or tested in practice. This thesis also provided ample suggestions for further research to tackle the issue by means of more innovative approaches.

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